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I. INTRODUCTION
Increasingly, life takes place in a digital world. In 2012,
Internet users across the US, UK, and Australia spent 27% of their
time online participating on social media websites.1 More than ever
before, social interactions are governed by emerging technology—
yet our copyright system has been slow to react, allowing
companies, which offer the services that users love, to take
advantage of those same users. Plain and simple, a large portion of
the content posted on social websites is copyrightable. 2 But,
through Terms of Service agreements, users license away every
single exclusive right that copyright laws grant them. 3 For this,
they receive nothing. Artful contract writing allows these
agreements to satisfy the law, continuing a trend where users give
away their valuable content in exchange for social network access.4
A remedy does not yet exist, at least so far as a court would
recognize, that would allow users to nullify these oppressive
agreements. These agreements change the incentive structure
underlying copyright law and should be constitutionally
prohibited.5
II. WHAT CONSTITUTES A SOCIAL MEDIA WEBSITE AND
IS CONTENT POSTED TO THESE WEBSITES
COPYRIGHTABLE?
Social media usage has grown exponentially since the turn of
the century, and as of January 2014, 74% of Internet users above

1

Experian Marketing Services Reveals 27 Percent of Time Spent Online is
on Social Networking in 2012, EXPERIAN (Apr. 16, 2013),
http://press.experian.com/United-States/Press-Release/experian-marketingservices-reveals-27-percent-of-time-spent-online-is-on-social-networking.aspx.
2
See infra Part I.
3
See infra Part II.A.1.a–d.
4
See infra Part III.
5
See infra Part IV.
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the age of 18 use some form of social networking website. 6 While
users of these sites can likely envision exactly what constitutes a
“social  networking” or  “social  media”  website,  defining  the  term  in  
a legal sense presents more difficulty. I propose a definition of
social media: Internet-based applications and tools that allow users
and communities to share, co-create, discuss, and modify
information and user-generated content (UGC). 7 This concept is
different from that of social networking, which describes websites
that   “facilitate   the   connection   of   users   via   online   technologies.”8
The distinction is a fine one, and certain websites would certainly
fall into both social media and social networking categories—the
important difference being a question of what the focus of user
interaction is, that is, whether the focus is UGC (social media), as
opposed to creating and maintaining social connections (social

6
Social Networking Fact Sheet, PEW RESEARCH INTERNET PROJECT,
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheets/social-networking-fact-sheet/
(last
visited Oct. 24, 2014) (82% of internet users aged 30–49 and 89% of users aged
18–29 utilize at least one social networking website).
7
Andreas M. Kaplan & Michael Haenlein, Users of the World, Unite! The
Challenges and Opportunities of Social Media, 53 BUS. HORIZONS 59, 61 (2010)
(defining  social  media  as  “a  group  of  Internet-based applications . . . that allow
the   creation   and   exchange   of   User   Generated   Content”   creating interactive
platforms through which this content can be shared and modified); see also
Social Media, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_media (last
modified Oct. 21, 2014).
8
Steven A. Cook, Hiroaki Ogata & Mark G. Elwell, Meta-Documentation:
The Dissemination of the Tacit Knowledge Inherently Attached to
Organisational Documents, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 21ST INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON COMPUTERS IN EDUCATION, 2 (2013), available at
http://icce2013bali.org/datacenter/mainconferenceproceedingsforindividualdow
nload/c4/C4-s-164.pdf (“Social  Network  Services  (SNS)  .  .  .  have  been  defined  
as a network of users who are typically connected offline . . . [but studies have
demonstrated] that SNS is also used as a way for users to venture out and make
contact with users outside their immediate circle of offline
friends/acquaintances.”).  
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networking).9 So, much like the relation of squares to rectangles,
social networking websites will always include UGC, but a social
media site will not always include the type of community
categorized as a social networking website. This article will
specifically discuss four social media websites: Facebook, Twitter,
LinkedIn, and YouTube. Before that discussion, however, the
above provided definition of social media admittedly requires
further qualification; most notably, what is UGC? Is this content
copyrightable? And, if so, who owns the copyright?
A. What is User-Generated Content?
Following the conclusion that social media websites are online
communities where users can interact with, post, and modify UGC,
we must determine precise boundaries for what might be
considered  “user-generated”  content.10 One author suggested that a
“user,”   in   regards   to   social   media, might be synonymous with an
“amateur,”11 but such a statement is simply not true—to be a user
simply requires an online avatar, whether famous or not, that can
represent either an individual or an organization. 12 The word
“generate” is a verb used to describe the process of producing

9
See id. (explaining that users are drawn to Social Network Services for
benefits such as friendship and advice giving/receiving, and eventually form
connections of trust).
10
See generally Len Glickman & Jessica Fingerhut, User-Generated
Content, 30 NOV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 3 (2012) (explaining  that  “there  is  no  widely  
accepted definition of user-generated  content,”  and  generally  describing  UGC  as  
“material  uploaded  on  the  Internet  by  website  users”).
11
See Steven Hetcher, User-Generated Content and the Future of
Copyright: Part One—Investiture of Ownership, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
863, 871 (2008).
12
Twitter Top 100 Most Followers, TWITTER COUNTER,
http://twittercounter.com/pages/100 (last visited Oct. 24, 2014). This regularly
updated  list  of  the  100  most  “followed”  users  on  Twitter  is  comprised  of  actors,  
musicians, athletes, politicians, as well as news outlets such as CNN.
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something, or causing something to be produced.13 User-generated
content, then, means that the individual or organization has
created, produced, or developed the content—the phrase in itself
would seem to contain an implicit level of creativity. 14
Content that is user-generated implies that the user had a hand
in making or editing the content to a large extent. Ultimately,
however, creativity is not the primary distinction between the
creation and curation of content—the latter describing the process
of gathering, sifting through, selecting, and presenting content.
Take for example Pinterest, where users curate content and
compile  “pins”  that  “are  visual  bookmarks  for  good  stuff  you  find  
anywhere   around   the   web.”15 Can   the   assembling   of   these   “pins”  
be inherently creative? Absolutely, and the law is prepared to
reward authors for such work.16 The contrast between curating and
creating,   then,   must   lie   in   the   user’s   role   in   producing   the  
content—where  “the  user  is  not  merely  a  casual  part  of  a  new  copy  
of   some   preexisting   content   being   reproduced.”17 The role of the
user in creating the content, or put another way, the extent of his or
her original contribution, has important implications as to the
copyright protection granted to the work. Before discussing the
strength of copyright protections in various UGC, we must first
determine what content, if any, is copyrightable.

13
Generate,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM,
http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/generate (last visited Oct. 24, 2014) (defining generate
as  “to  produce  (something)  or  cause  (something)  to  be  produced”).  
14
Sacha Wunsch-Vincent & Graham Vickery, Participative Web: UserCreated Content, WORKING PARTY ON THE INFORMATION ECONOMY 8 (2007),
http://www.oecd.org/sti/38393115.pdf.
15
About Pinterest, PINTEREST, https://about.pinterest.com/en (last visited
Oct. 24, 2014).
16
Fiest  Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350–51 (1991)
(“A   factual   compilation   is   eligible   for   copyright   if   it   features   an   original  
selection or arrangement or facts, but the copyright is limited to the particular
selection  or  arrangement.”).  
17
Hetcher, supra note 11, at 871–872.
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B. Is User-Generated Content Copyrightable?
In order to receive copyright protection, a work must be both
original and fixed in a tangible medium of expression.18 Case law
has held that copying a file to RAM fulfills the fixation
requirement because the copy   can   be   “perceived,   reproduced,   or  
otherwise   communicated,”   even   if   for   a   temporary   period   of  
time.19 Applying this standard to social media content will result in
the same outcome, as the work is posted online for the purpose of
being perceived and reproduced, and will thus satisfy the
constitutional requirement of fixation. 20 A more disputable
question arises when UGC is forced to fulfill the requirement of
originality. The long applied standard for originality in copyright is
“extremely   low . . . [requiring   only]   some   creative   spark,   ‘no  
matter  how  crude,  humble,  or  obvious’  it might  be.”21 And, while
novelty is not necessary,22 the  work  must  “owe  its  origin”23 to the
author, or—in the case of online media—to the posting user.24 But
as a baseline, user-generated content can be copyrightable, and

18

17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012); see London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1,
542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 171 (D. Mass. 2008) (holding that a sound recording
downloaded via peer-to-peer file sharing was fixed for the purposes of the
Copyright Act); Stenograph L.L.C. v. Bossard Assocs., Inc., 144 F.3d 96 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) (holding that the installation of software onto a computer constituted
created  a  “fixed”  copy).
19
MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir.
1993) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)); see also Vault Corp. v. Quaid
Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
20
17  U.S.C.  §102(a)  (2013)  (“Copyright  protection  subsists  .  .  .  in  original  
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . .”)
(emphasis added).
21
Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 (1991) (quoting 1 M. N IMMER, NIMMER on
COPYRIGHT § 108[c][1] (1988)).
22
Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102–103 (1879).
23
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57–58 (1884).
24
Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951)
(“‘Original’   in   reference   to   a   copyrighted   work   means   that   the   particular   work  
‘owes   its   origin’   to   the   ‘author.’   No   large   measure   of   novelty   is   necessary.”)  
(quoting Baker, 101 U.S. at 102–103)).
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courts have fielded a variety of infringement actions regarding
UGC and the websites that host it. 25 While not all UGC posted
online will meet this originality threshold, some certainly will. But
where are we to draw the dividing line?
1. What UGC is Copyrightable?
Spontaneity and community, two features that make social
media so unique and popular, also present the most difficult issues
regarding  the  copyrightability  of  UGC.  A  “tweet,”  an  opinionated  
blog posting, or a Facebook  “status  update”  come  directly  from  the  
mind of the user and are posted to the internet—this is expression
in its most basic sense, and would certainly seem to fulfill the
originality and fixation requirements of copyright law.26 Due to its
nature, however, UGC runs into problems when coping with (1)
the interaction of originality and length, and (2) the related issues
presented when considering the doctrine of merger.
a. The Preclusion of Copyright Protection Due to Length or
the Doctrine of Merger
The social media platform Twitter, where tweets are famously
limited to 140 characters, would seem to come under the heaviest
scrutiny when discussing the interplay between length and
originality. While there is no length requirement for a work to be
eligible for copyright protection, courts are averse, for good
reason, to grant protection to short phrases.27 This is not an end-all,
25

Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc., 993 F. Supp. 2d 1192 (C.D. Cal. 2014)
(questioning whether a bulletin board website that hosted infringing photographs
could receive immunity under the §512 safe harbor provision); Wolk v. Kodak
Imaging Network, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (action concerning
the application of the §512 safe harbor provision for the website Photobucket);
See Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008)
(infringement action concerning a video on YouTube).
26
Feist,  499  U.S.   at  346  (1991)  (a   work  is  original  if  it  is  “founded  in  the  
creative  powers  of  the  mind”).
27
Kitchens of Sara Lee, Inc. v. Nifty Foods Corp., 266 F.2d 541, 544 (2d
Cir.   1959)   (“[S]logans, and other short phrases or expressions cannot be
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but it does raise the bar for copyrightability—for  the  “smaller  the  
effort the greater must be the creativity in order to claim copyright
protection.”28 For a tweet to be copyrightable, then, it would need
to contain a patently original arrangement of words, or perhaps the
creative fashioning of new (or combined) words. 29
Copyrightability also hinges on the necessity that the work
represents an expression, rather than an idea, and that the idea is
capable of many modes of expression—certainly we would not
grant copyright protection to a tweet that simply states, “So  excited  
for  the  weekend!”  
The doctrine of merger focuses on whether a specific idea is
capable of various modes of expression, or whether the expression
is  “ineluctably  and  inextricably  intertwined  with  the  idea.”30 UGC
on social media websites—much of which is aimed at expressing

copyrighted.”   (quoting   Copyright   Office   Publ’n, No. 46, COPYRIGHT IN
COMMERCIAL PRINTS AND LABELS (1958)); see also Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits,
Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1080–81 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that copyright could
not be granted to the textual logo on a Skyy vodka bottle without accompanying
illustrations or considering the bottle as a whole).
28
1 M. Nimmer, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.01[B] (1988).
29
Rich Stim, Copyright Protection for Short Phrases, STANFORD
UNIVERSITY
LIBRARIES
(Sept.
9,
2003),
http://fairuse.stanford.edu/2003/09/09/copyright_protection_for_short/
(“Whether   you   can   stop   someone   else   from   using   your   literary   phrases   is  
dependent upon the uniqueness and value of the phrases as well as the way in
which  you  use  them.”);;  see Heim v. Universal Pictures Co., 154 F.2d 480, 488
(2d  Cir.  1946)  (copying  might  be  demonstrated  “by  showing  that  a  single  brief  
phrase, contained in both pieces, was so idiosyncratic in its treatment as to
preclude  coincidence”).  
30
Coquico, Inc. v. Rodriguez-Miranda, 562 F.3d 62, 68 (1st Cir. 2009); see
Mason   v.   Montgomery   Data,   Inc.,   967   F.2d   135,   139   (5th   Cir.   1992)   (“If   the  
court concludes that the idea and its expression are inseparable, then the merger
doctrine   applies   and   the   expression   will   not   be   protected.”);;   Apple Computer,
Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983) (stating
that the inquiry is whether the idea and its expression have merged, which
occurs  “when  there  are  no  or  few  other  ways  of  expressing  a  particular  idea”).  
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one’s  self31—can in many circumstances be so simple or common
that the subject matter would be appropriated were we to award a
copyright for its expression. 32 Or, take a news service posting
breaking stories on social media: could a short description of the
story followed by a link to the entire story be copyrightable? It
would seem that a summary of a factual story would necessarily be
merged with the factual content it expresses, making it unfit for
copyright. 33 Yet, this certainly does not preclude all UGC from
copyright protection—there exist a plethora of sufficiently unique
UGC to be found on any social media website.
Another example is a photograph uploaded to a social media
website. Our copyright system has long recognized copyright
protection for photographs, so long as   they   are   “original  
conceptions   of   the   author.” 34 The fact that the author of a
photograph, a user, uploads the photo onto a social media website
does not exhaust his or her interest in controlling the distribution of
the work—no compensation was paid, meaning that this situation

31

Sonia Livingstone, Taking Risky Opportunities in Youthful Content
Creation: Teenagers Use of Social Networking Sites of Intimacy, Privacy and
Self-Expression, 10(3) NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 393, 397 (2008) (explaining that
teenagers use Facebook as a medium to express who they are and what they are
feeling to others in their online community).
32
2 William F. Patry, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 4:46 (WestlawNext Database
updated  Sept.   2014)  (“[I]t  is necessary to say that subject matter [merged with
its expression] would be appropriated by permitting the copyrighting of its
expression. We cannot recognize copyright as a game of chess in which the
public  can  be  checkmated.”).
33
Kimberley Isbell, The Rise of the News Aggregator: Legal Implications
and Best Practices BERKMAN CENTER RESEARCH PUBLICATION NO. 2010-10
(Aug. 30, 2010), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1670339.
34
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53,   58   (1884)   (“We
entertain no doubt that the constitution is broad enough to cover an act
authorizing copyright of photographs, so far as they are representatives of
original  intellectual  conceptions  of  the  author.”); see Latimer v. Roaring Toyz,
Inc., 601 F.3d 1224 (11th Cir. 2010) (analyzing a case of alleged infringement
of digital photographs and shows that copyright can indeed be granted to photos
that exist only in digital format).
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does  not  implicate  the  “first  sale”  doctrine.35 Similarly, a user who
recounts a story via a Facebook status update could claim
copyright ownership to that writing, so long as a grant of copyright
would not be precluded by the doctrines discussed above. Or, even
a joke being told via Twitter36 can certainly possess the originality
required to receive copyright protection in the work. Take for
instance original videos, scholarly articles, and blog posts; the
examples are plenty, and users clearly have copyright interests in
original content uploaded to social media websites. This
framework is more complicated, however, when considering
compilation works where users have appropriated content from all
over the web.
b. Modifying or Combining Previously Posted Works
In the case of a compilation work where the user has not
created any of the compiled material, the compilation only receives
limited  protection  to  the  extent  that  the  “selection,  coordination,  or  
arrangement”   of   the   material   is   original. 37 So in the case of a
Pinterest   user’s   “pins,”   the   user   would   need   to   show   that   an  
infringer had copied an original element of the compilation—this

35

Sebastian  Int’l,  Inc.  v.  Consumer  Contacts,  Ltd.,  847 F.2d 1093, 1095 (3d
Cir. 1988) (“The copyright statutes have been amended repeatedly in an attempt
to balance the authors' interest in the control and exploitation of their writings
with society's competing stake in the free flow of ideas, information and
commerce. Ultimately, the copyright law regards financial reward to the owner
as   a   secondary   consideration.”   (citing   Sony   Corp.   of   Am.   v.   Universal   City  
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)) (citation omitted)).
36
E.g., @Jay_FrickinLynn, TWITTER (May 7, 2014, 5:05 PM),
https://twitter.com/Jay_FrickinLynn/status/464164101665476610   (“Stabbing
yourself  in  the  gums  with  a  chip  is  God's  way  of  fat  shaming  you.”).  
37
Fiest Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 359
(“[C]opyright  protects  only  the  elements  that  owe  their  origin to the compiler—
the   selection,   coordination,   and   arrangement”   of   material.);;   see 17 U.S.C.
§ 103(b)   (2012)   (“The   copyright   in   a   compilation   .   .   .   extends   only   to   the  
material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the
preexisting material employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive
right  in  the  preexisting  material.”).  
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would certainly not be an easy task. 38 Similarly, a user who
modifies a work or object from the public domain would receive
thin copyright protection for the new work. 39 This grant of
copyright would only protect original expressions that the user
actually contributed to the underlying idea. 40 In both cases, the
ability of the user to safeguard his or her work is extremely limited
because of the reduced copyright protection interests therein.
Alternatively, because of the ease of appropriating content
illegally online, there are issues with the copyrightability of much
posted content—namely, that these works do   not   “owe   [their]  
origin”   to   the   posting   user   (the   purported   author). 41 Under these
circumstances, the appropriating user could consider a fair use
defense; however, the availability of such a defense is contingent
on  the  user’s  purpose  for  reproducing  the original.42 The Copyright
Act lists a four-factor analysis for fair use; however, such a
determination   is   “an   open-ended and context-sensitive   inquiry.”43
38
Fiest,  499  U.S.  at  361  (“[T]he  selection  and  arrangement  of  facts  cannot  
be  so  mechanical  or  routine  as  to  require  no  creativity  whatsoever  .  .  .  .”).  
39
Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 812 (9th Cir. 2003) (An artist who
created a jellyfish sculpture was only granted copyright protection to the extent
that the artistic choices were not governed by jellyfish physiology. The court
explained that this protection  is  “thin”  in  that  the  artist  “may prevent others from
copying the original features he contributed, but he may not prevent others from
copying elements of expression that nature displays for all observers . . . .”).
40
Id. at   813   (“An artist may . . . protect the original expression he or she
contributes to these ideas. An artist may vary the pose, attitude, gesture, muscle
structure,  facial  expression,  coat,  or  texture  of  animal.”).
41
Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951).
This is assuming the user does not attribute the material to its author or home
website.
42
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (The fair use defense applies so long as the
original  work  was  appropriated  “for purposes such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or
research . . . .”).  
43
Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 250–51 (2d Cir. 2006); see 17 U.S.C.
§ 107 (1–4) (listing the factors to determine the existence of fair use: (1) the
purpose and character of the use, (2) the nature of the copyrighted work, (3) the
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work
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Because fair use is fact intensive and many social media Terms of
Service agreements prohibit illegal posting of material, 44 user
appropriation of otherwise copyrighted material is outside the
scope of this article’s   discussion.45 Additionally, because of their
reduced copyright protection interests, curated works
(compilations) and those with thin copyright protection also fall
somewhat outside of this discussion.

as a whole, and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work).
44
Most, if not all, social media websites are immune from liability for
infringing material uploaded by its users via the mechanisms outlined in § 512
of the copyright act. This section lists takedown requirements for websites that
host user material, which, if followed, allow the site to gain immunity from
contributory infringement claims. Because of this, social media sites hold little
responsibility regarding user posted material infringing copyrights within their
domains. For more information on these requirements see 17 U.S.C. § 512
(2012).
45
See Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, § 5.1, FACEBOOK (last
updated Nov. 15, 2013), https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms [hereinafter
Facebook Rights & Responsibilities] (The user must agree to “not  post  content  
or take any action on Facebook that infringes or violates someone else's rights or
otherwise  violates  the  law.”);;  Terms of Service, § 9, TWITTER (last updated Sept.
8, 2014), https://twitter.com/tos [hereinafter Twitter Terms of Service]  (“Twitter
respects the intellectual property rights of others and expects users of the
Services to do the same. We will respond to notices of alleged copyright
infringement  that  comply  with  applicable  law  and  are  properly  provided  to  us.”);;  
User Agreement, § 11, LINKEDIN (last updated Mar. 16, 2014),
https://www.linkedin.com/legal/user-agreement [hereinafter LinkedIn User
Agreement] (“[T]his  Agreement  requires  that  information  posted  by  Members  be  
accurate and not in violation of the intellectual property rights or other rights of
third  parties.”);;  Terms of Service, § 6.F, YOUTUBE (last updated June 9, 2010),
https://www.youtube.com/static?template=terms [hereinafter YouTube Terms of
Service] (“YouTube   does   not   permit   copyright   infringing   activities   and  
infringement of intellectual property rights on this Service, and YouTube will
remove all Content if properly notified that such Content  infringes  on  another’s  
intellectual  property  rights.”).
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C. Who Owns Copyrightable Content on Social Media Websites?
The  Copyright  Act  states  that  a  “copyright  in  a  work  protected  
under this title vests initially in the author or authors of the
work.”46 In many cases, this analysis is very straightforward: a user
creates a song, video, or text posting from scratch, and uploads it
to the social media site of their choice—thus there is little question
as to who owns the copyrighted content. 47 Issues of ownership,
however, do arise, sometimes in ways that are unique to social
media, and in ways that are not. These questions span topics from
collaborative work 48 and works made for hire 49 to infringement
and associated penalties.
1. Implications of Joint Authorship in Social Media
A joint work is defined in the Copyright Act as one that is
“prepared   by   two   or   more   authors   with   the   intention   that   their  
contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of
a  unitary  whole.”50 This requires a specific mental state, and in the
absence of a contractual agreement, courts will look to whether the

46

17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2012)  (also  relevant  is  that  “authors  of  a  joint   work  
are  coowners  of  copyright  in  the  work”).  
47
Will Clark, Copyright, Ownership, and Control of User-Generated
Content on Social Media Websites 8, CHI.-KENT COLL. L. REV. (2009),
http://www.kentlaw.edu/perritt/courses/seminar/papers%202009%20fall/Jerry%
20clark%20final%20Copyright,%20Ownership,%20and%20Control%20of%20
User-Generated%20Content%20on%20Social%20Media%20Websites.pdf
(listing examples of a mother posting a picture of her child on Facebook, or an
independent band uploading a self-made music video on YouTube).
48
See generally Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2000)
(establishing a framework for determining, the point at which a contributor can
be  considered  an  author  in  joint  work,  for  “that  authorship  is  not  the  same  thing  
as  making  a  valuable  and  copyrightable  contribution”).  
49
See generally Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730
(1989) (establishing a balancing test for determining when an author is an
employee, as described using common law agency principles, for the purposes
of  whether  a  created  work  is  a  “work  made  for  hire”).  
50
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
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contributing artists  expected  to  be  viewed  as  “co-authors.”51 While
in some ways social media brings nothing new to the joint
authorship table (artists corresponding digitally to co-author a
book, a virtual band, 52 etc.), there are ways in which digital
interaction differs fundamentally from the real world.
Take, for example, a conversation on Facebook taking place
through   a   single   “post”   and   numerous   “comments”   on   that post
(for   simplicity’s   sake,   let   us   assume   this   is   a   two-user
conversation). Quite obviously, it is unlikely that the users had the
intent to create any work, let alone a unitary work with any
consideration of joint authorship. Such a conclusion is
unsurprising; yet, it does not end our analysis. First, the call-andresponse nature of online chat interaction lends itself well to an
implicit intent to create a joint work. Surely, both users understand
that they are contributing only part of the original material in the
work, and intend the final chat dialog to be a summation of both
users’   responses   to   one   another.   Objectively, and assuming the
users contributed a relatively equal amount to the original post and
various comment responses, there would seem to be intent to
create a joint work.53 While either user would have a difficult time
showing subjective intent to create a work (simply because neither
user considers their chat to be the creation of a work at all), intent
of the parties can also be determined through their actions in
51
Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 508 (2d Cir. 1991) (explaining that the
inquiry   is   whether   the   authors   “entertain   in   their   minds   the   concept   of   joint  
authorship, whether or not they understood precisely the legal consequences of
that   relationship”);;   see also Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061,
1069  (7th  Cir.  1994)  (“Even  if  two  or  more  persons  collaborate  with  the  intent  to  
create  a  unitary  work,  the  product  will  be  considered  a  ‘joint  work’  only  if  the  
collaborators  can  be  considered  ‘authors.’”).  
52
See Cristen Conger, What is a Virtual Band?, HOWSTUFFWORKS,
http://electronics.howstuffworks.com/virtual-band.htm (last visited Oct. 20,
2014).
53
Therese M. Brady, Manifest Intent and Copyrightability: The Destiny of
Joint Authorship, 17 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 257, 269   (1989)   (“The   authors’  
objective  contributions  to  a  joint  work  determine  ownership.”).  
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creating the work.54 Such a determination would ultimately be fact
intensive, but, as a general matter, two users writing and
responding to one another certainly seem to have a mutual intent to
create a chat dialog.55
Along with intent to create a joint work, each party’s  
contribution must be independently copyrightable. 56 Without a
specific chat interaction to analyze, this discussion will remain
relatively rudimentary. The originality threshold for copyrightable
works is low—assuming that the summation of each user’s   chat  
contributions was somewhat significant and creative, there should
be no issue in regards to originality. 57 Once a chat response is
posted, it has been fixed in a tangible medium, the second
requirement of copyrightability.
So, it would seem that two users could be granted joint
authorship protection for a combined chat dialog. But, does the
same reasoning apply in a more complicated context where users
contribute independently to a much larger whole?

54

Id. at  277  (“[T]he  court  in  Strauss v. Hearst Corp. followed the common
design doctrine by determining the intent of the parties from their actions in
creating   the   work.”);;   see Strauss v. Hearst Corp., 1988 WL 18932,   *6   (“Here
there is no doubt that Strauss and   Popular   Mechanics   intended   that   ‘their  
contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary
whole.’   In   fact,   it   is   hard   to   imagine   a   set   of   facts   that is any clearer on that
point.”).
55
Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 201–02   (2d   Cir.   1998)   (“[T]he  
contribution even of significant language to a work does not automatically
suffice to confer co-author status on the contributor . . . a specific finding of
mutual  intent  remains  necessary.”).  
56
Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1071 (7th Cir. 1994)
(applying a two-pronged test for joint authorship, requiring: (1) that the parties
intended to be joint authors at the time of work creation, and (2) that their
contribution were independently copyrightable).
57
Nimmer, supra note 28, § 2.01[A]   (“Originality   in   the   copyright   sense  
means only that the work owes its origin to the author, i.e., is independently
created,  and  not  copied  from  other  works.”).
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a. The Wikipedia Conundrum
Wikipedia   is   “a   multilingual, web-based, free-content
encyclopedia project . . . [that] is written collaboratively by largely
anonymous   Internet   volunteers   who   write   without   pay.” 58 These
circumstances seem most comparable to a film, a large-scale
project where the legal question yearning for an answer is whether
a particular contributor is an author of the joint work under the
purposes of 17 U.S.C. § 101.59 The court in Aalmuhammed v. Lee
outlined important factors when looking for joint authorship in
absence of a contract:60 (1) the degree of control exercised over the
work; (2) an objective manifestation of shared intent to be
coauthors; and   (3)   the   share   of   each   contribution   in   the   work’s  
success cannot be appraised. 61 Because of the wide range of
interactions and contributions that might arise on Wikipedia, there
are some circumstances where the Aalmuhammed test is fulfilled,
and many where it is not.
Consider two specific fact scenarios: First, where a group of
five users write an entire Wikipedia article about the company that
they work for together. Second, where a few unacquainted users

58

Wikipedia:
About,
WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:About (last modified Oct. 8, 2014)
(Wikipedia allows anybody with Internet access to edit and write new material
for its articles, as well as contribute references, images, and other media).
59
Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1232 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that
authorship is statutorily required for the formation of a joint work, and that
“authorship   is   not   the   same   thing   as   making   a   valuable   and   copyrightable  
contribution”);;  see 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
60
It   is   recognized   that   Wikipedia   contributors   must   agree   to   the   website’s  
Terms of Use, which is a contract. And while the lack of reference to joint
authorship in these terms is telling, there is potential joint authorship between
the many contributors of a particular article, and certainly these independent
writers have not signed a contract between one another. See Terms of Use,
WIKIMEDIA FOUNDATION, http://wikimediafoundation.org/wiki/Terms_of_Use
[hereinafter Wikimedia Terms of Use] (last modified July 8, 2014).
61
See Aalmuhammed,  202  F.3d  at  1234  (“Control  in  many  cases  will  be  the  
most  important  factor.”).  
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submit   content   on   a   large   Wikipedia   article   (let’s   say,   SpiderMan62) that is in turn edited by another set of users (this is the
common practice on the website).63 Looking to the first set of facts
and applying the Aalmuhammed factors, the Wikipedia article
could be found to be a joint work (relying on some important
assumptions   about   the   users’   conduct).   Control, the first factor,
looks to exercising superintendence over the work; in other words,
creating or giving effect to the ideas.64 To fulfill this element, the
users would need to work on a level playing field, where no single
writer would tell the others what to write or have the ability to
unilaterally veto contributions of the others. 65 Running on this
assumption, the users would likely each contribute a comparable
amount to the work, and through these efforts could be said to have
met the second factor by making an “objective   manifestation   of  
intent   to   be   coauthors.” 66 And finally, because each user would
equally  help  bring  about  the  ultimate  whole,  the  “audience  appeal  
of   the   work”   would   turn   on   their   collective, not individual,
contributions. 67 These facts are, admittedly, quite specific and
62

Spider-Man, WIKIPEDIA (last updated Oct. 20, 2014, 7:48 AM),
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spider-Man.
63
Henry Blodget, Who the Hell Writes Wikipedia, Anyway?, BUSINESS
INSIDER (Jan. 3, 2009, 8:39 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/2009/1/whothe-hell-writes-wikipedia-anyway   (“The   bulk   of   the   original   content   on  
Wikipedia is contributed by tens of thousands of outsiders, each of whom may
not make many other contributions to the site. The bulk of the changes to the
original text, then, are made by a core group of heavy editors who make
thousands  of  tiny  edits.”).  
64
Aalmuhammed, 202  F.3d  at  1234  (“[A]n  author  ‘superintend[s]’  the  work  
by   exercising   control.”   (quoting   Burrow-Giles v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 61
(1884)).
65
See id. at 1234–35. In Aalmuhammed, Spike Lee was in control of the
creation of a movie because Lee was not bound to accept any recommendations
and ultimately chose what was included in the film and what was not.
66
Id. at 1235.
67
Id. at 1234 (“[T]he   audience   appeal   of   the   work   turns   on   both  
contributions   and   ‘the   share   of   each   in   its   success   cannot   be   appraised.’”  
(quoting Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 140 F.2d 266,
267 (2d Cir. 1944))).
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somewhat unrealistic, but they do illustrate that a group of users
could contribute to a Wikipedia article, and have an expectation of
copyright ownership in it.
The more common occurrence on Wikipedia is one where
multiple authors contribute a bulk of the substance, which is in turn
edited by a number of other users. Clearly, there is no control by
any one user over the work—indeed, any Internet user can make
changes to a Wikipedia page. 68 It is this same characteristic that
makes it impossible for all contributors to a work to hold any
expectation of joint authorship: edits can be made anonymously
and without approval of previous writers/editors.69 The ability to
appraise each contribution need not be discussed, for the first two
elements weigh strongly against the determination that a joint work
has been created.70
Regardless, Wikipedia states in its Terms of Service agreement
that users who submit copyrightable work agree to license such
work under either (or both) the Creative Commons AttributionShareAlike 3.0 Unported License or the GNU Free Documentation
License. 71 The Creative Commons license allows other users to
share and adapt uploaded content (even commercially) so long as
proper attribution is given, and additional restrictions are not added

68
See Wikimedia Terms of Use, supra note 60 (“We  welcome  you  (‘you’  or  
the  ‘user’)  as  a  reader,  editor,  author,  or  contributor  of  the  Wikimedia  Projects,  
and   we   encourage   you   to   join   the   Wikimedia   community.”);;   see also Blodget,
supra note 63 (“What users love about Wikipedia is the ability to make minor
contributions (on the fly) to an existing piece of work—they don't want to read
or  vote  on  a  handful  of  competing  ‘articles’  and  petition  a  single  author  to  make  
changes.”).  
69
See Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1235 (noting as significant that none of
the parties expressed any intention of co-authorship). Likewise, a heavy content
contributor on Wikipedia could not express an intention to be considered a coauthor with an editor whom he or she knows nothing about.
70
Id. (“[A]bsence of control is strong evidence of the absence of coauthorship.”).  
71
Wikimedia Terms of Use, supra note 60.
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to the content. 72 The GNU license carries very similar terms. 73
Wikipedia contributors must agree to apply one of these licenses to
their copyrighted work, so it is of little consequence whether or not
a joint work has been created. However, such issues could arise on
other social media platforms and illustrate a complex and unique
copyright issue presented by Internet usage in conjunction with
authorship.
b. Social Media and Employment
The use of social media within the employment sphere presents
unique issues in regards to the ownership of UGC. If an employee
uses his or her social media avatar to develop business contacts,
court new clients, or post company information, could this not be
part of their work on behalf of the employer?74 The Copyright Act
provides for two circumstances in which a work will be one that
was made for hire: (1) the work is prepared by an employee in the
scope of his or her employment, or (2) the work is specially
ordered or commissioned.75 Of those two mechanisms for creating
72

Attribution
3.0
United
States,
CREATIVE
COMMONS,
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/us/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2014)
(defining   “Share”   as   “copy   and   redistribute   the   material   in   any   medium   or  
format”   and   Adapt   as   “remix,   transform,   and   build   upon   the   material.”).   Also  
worth  noting  is  that  the   “licensor cannot revoke these freedoms as long as you
follow  the  license  terms.”  Id.
73
GNU Free Documentation License, GNU OPERATING SYSTEM § 2 (Nov.
3,   2008),   http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.html   (“You may copy and distribute
the Document in any medium, either commercially or noncommercially,
provided that this License, the copyright notices, and the license notice saying
this License applies to the Document are reproduced in all copies, and that you
add no other conditions whatsoever to those of this License.”).  
74
See G. Ross Allen & Francine D. Ward,   Things   Aren’t   Always   as   They  
Appear: Who Really Owns Your User Generated Content?, 3 No. 2 LANDSLIDE
49,  52  (2010)  (“A business's social media policy should be sure to address how
employees may reference and use business property such as communications,
press releases, and trademarks, when mixing such content with the employees'
personal  property.”).
75
17 U.S.C. § 101  (2012)  (“A  ‘work  made  for  hire’  is  . . . a work specially
ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work . . . if the
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a work made for hire, the former can create much more substantial
issues for employees.
What does it mean for content to be prepared in the scope of
employment? Statutory interpretation of this part of the Copyright
Act has led to the adoption of common-law agency principles for
determining what constitutes the scope of employment. 76 Looking
to those principles, an employee is acting within the scope of
employment if: (1)   it   is   the   kind   of   work   “he   is   employed   to  
perform”; (2)   “it   occurs   substantially   within   the   authorized   time  
and   space   limits”; and   (3)   “it   is   actuated,   at   least   in   part,   by   a  
purpose   to   serve”   the   employer. 77 As is evident, these limits go
beyond the use of a company avatar in social media, and could
very easily   extend   to   UGC   posted   from   an   employee’s   personal  
account.
III. TERMS OF SERVICE AND THEIR USE IN SOCIAL
MEDIA
Terms of Service, also referred to as Terms of Use or Terms
and Conditions, are a series of rules or conditions one must agree
to in order to use   a   web   service.   Earning   the   name   “clickwrap”  
agreements, such terms have been upheld by courts so long as
users are given a clear opportunity to read through the agreement.78
parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work
shall  be  considered  a  work  made  for  hire.”).  
76
See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 740 (1989)
(“[W]e   have concluded that Congress intended to describe the conventional
master-servant relationship as understood by common-law  agency  doctrine.”).  
77
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958) (listing a fourth
factor:   “if  force  is  intentionally   used  by   the   servant against another, the use of
force  is  not  unexpectable  by  the  master”).  
78
Hancock   v.   AT&T   Co.,   701   F.3d   1248,   1256   (10th   Cir.   2012)   (“Courts  
evaluate   whether   a   clickwrap   agreement’s   terms   were   clearly   presented   to   the  
consumer, the consumer had an opportunity to read the agreement, and the
consumer   manifested   an   unambiguous   acceptance   of   the   terms.”);;   see also
Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 32–35 (2d Cir. 2002)
(“[W]here consumers are urged to download free software at the immediate
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While each social media site drafts and implements its own terms,
the agreements share many similarities 79 —unsurprising
considering how comparable the services offered through the
various websites are. So long as the terms of service do not bury
specific terms so as to surprise users, 80 the contracts are
enforceable. Thus, users are faced with a choice to either accept
the terms or refrain from taking part in social media.
A. Licensing the Use of User-Generated Content
A user does not relinquish ownership or rights in copyrightable
material merely by agreeing to the terms of service of a particular
social media website. For example, a Twitter user grants Twitter “a  
worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free license (with the right to
sublicense) to use, copy, reproduce, process, adapt, modify,
publish, transmit, display and distribute such Content.” 81 The
agreement also allows Twitter to share this content with other
companies   “with   no   compensation   paid”   to   the   user. 82 But even
though the user retains ownership of the content, he or she

click of a button, a reference to the existence of license terms on a submerged
screen is not sufficient to place consumers on inquiry or constructive notice of
those terms . . . . [R]easonably conspicuous notice of the existence of contract
terms and unambiguous manifestation of assent to those terms by consumers are
essential  if  electronic  bargaining  is  to  have  integrity  and  credibility.”)  (footnote  
omitted); Serrano v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 863 F. Supp. 2d 157, 164
(E.D.N.Y. 2012) (“In   the   context   of   agreements made over the internet, such
“click-wrap”   contracts   are   enforced   under   New   York   law   as   long   as   the  
consumer is given a sufficient opportunity to read the end-user license
agreement, and assents thereto after being provided with an unambiguous
method  of  accepting  or  declining  the  offer.”).
79
Compare Facebook Rights & Responsibilities, supra note 45, with Twitter
Terms of Service, supra note 45, and LinkedIn User Agreement, supra note 45,
and YouTube Terms of Service, supra note 45.
80
Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 606 (E.D.Pa. 2007)
(explaining that burying an arbitration provision in a lengthy paragraph under
the  heading  “GENERAL  PROVISIONS”  caused  surprise  to  the  user).  
81
Twitter Terms of Service, supra note 45.
82
Id.
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effectively loses the right control the dissemination of the work.
Terms of service agreements, in general, license a significant
chunk of exclusive rights associated with copyright, and have
vague limitations on such a license. However, each should be
individually examined to determine exactly what rights a user
forfeits by registering an account on the specific website.
What follows is an analysis of the intellectual property license
provisions found in the Terms of Service agreements of four social
media websites: Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, and YouTube.
When interpreting   contracts,   the   “fundamental   objective   .   .   .   is   to  
give   effect   to   the   expressed   intentions   of   the   parties.” 83 The
objective intent of the parties governs the interpreted meaning, and
when   the   contractual   language   is   unambiguous,   “the   instrument  
alone   is   taken   to   express   the   intent   of   the   parties.”84 If ambiguity
does exist as to the terms of a contract, the principal purpose of the
parties is given great weight (if ascertainable); the writing is
interpreted as a whole; and, unless a different intention is
manifested, words are given their prevailing meaning. 85 If the
83

Klos v. Lotnicze, 133 F.3d 164, 168 (2d Cir. 1997).
Swaminathan v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 962 F.2d 387, 389 (5th Cir. 1992)
(“When   interpreting   the   meaning   of   a   contract   it   is   the   objective,   and   not   the  
subjective intent of the parties which controls. When a contract is unambiguous,
the  instrument  alone  is  taken  to  express  the  intent  of  the  parties.”)  (citing  Fuller  
v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 872 F.2d 655 (5th Cir. 1989); Shelton v. Exxon Corp.,
921 F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1991)); see also Royal Ins. Co. of Am. v. Orient
Overseas Container Line Ltd., 525 F.3d 409, 421 (6th Cir. 2008) (Where
contract  language  is  unambiguous,  “a  court  should  not  use  extrinsic  evidence  to  
‘attempt   to   discern   the   intent   of   the   parties,’   but   rather   should   determine   their  
intent from ‘the   plain   language   of   the   contract.’”   (quoting   United   States   v.  
Donovan, 348 F.3d 509, 512 (6th Cir. 2003))).
85
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202 (1981); see also Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States, 444 F.2d 547, 551 (Ct.   Cl.   1971)   (“[T]he  
language of a contract must be afforded the meaning derived from the contract
by a reasonably intelligent person acquainted with the contemporary
circumstances.”)  (citing  Hol-Gar Mfg. Corp. v. United States, 169 Ct. Cl. 384,
388 (Ct. Cl. 1965); Deloro Smelting and Refining Co. v. United States, 161 Ct.
Cl. 489, 495 (Ct. Cl. 1963)).
84
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contract contains technical terms, those terms are given their
meaning within the technical field. Given that this analysis will
look to the Terms of Service agreements devoid of specific factual
circumstances, a few generalizations must be made about both
users and social media websites to help ascertain their respective
“principal  purpose(s)”  for  entering  into  an  agreement.  
Users utilize social media to stay in touch with friends and
family, reconnect with old friends, and connect with others sharing
similar hobbies or interests. 86 To engage in such behavior, users
will chat directly with one another; post their own pictures,
thoughts, and creations; and recommend links to various web
pages they personally found interesting. Users agree to Terms of
Service agreements in order to gain access to the networks that the
websites provide. Social media websites are often operated as
corporations and as such, make a profit (usually through
advertising or subscriptions) for each new user that the service is
able to attract.87 Social media websites, then, want to increase the
number of users, and likely, the number of ways that active users
can ultimately interact; these interactions draw early users to a

86

Aaron Smith, Why Americans Use Social Media, PEW RESEARCH
PROJECT
(Nov.
15,
2011),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2011/11/15/why-americans-use-social-media/
(finding that 67% and 64% of polled users responded that staying in touch with
current friends and family members, respectively, is a major reason they use
social media; 50% also listed reconnecting with old friends a major reason; and
14% listed connecting with others who shared hobbies as a major reason, 35%
as a minor reason, for their social media use).
87
See Facebook, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 42 (Sept. 30, 2014),
available
at
http://investor.fb.com/secfiling.cfm?filingID=1326801-14-7
(explaining   that   Facebook   gained   an   average   revenue   per   user   (“ARPU”)   of  
$6.81 in the year 2013); Twitter, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 48 (Sept.
30,
2014),
available
at
https://investor.twitterinc.com/secfiling.cfm?filingID=950123-143031&CIK=1418091#TWTR10K_20131231_HTM_ITEM_7_MANAGEMENT_S_DISCUSSION
(listing
various  graphs  that  chart  Twitter’s  advertising  income  per  1,000  timeline  views).  
INTERNET
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particular social media site, and the establishment of networks
ultimately will bring the hordes.
The principal purpose for users and social media websites to
enter into an agreement with one another is inextricably linked:
users want to join large networks for the social benefits they
provide, and social media sites want to provide large networks for
the advertising revenue they generate. Intellectual property is an
ancillary bargaining chip of these desires, in that the use of a wide
variety of UGC—text posting, chat interaction, videos, pictures,
music, et cetera—will draw more users, create larger networks, and
allow for more diverse interactions. When interpreting these
agreements, then, it is important to keep in mind that users are
most likely willing to license their intellectual property in order to
gain access to the full benefits that the various social media
websites offer.
1. Facebook
The Facebook terms of service regarding posted intellectual
property state  that  the  user  specifically  grants  the  website  a  “nonexclusive, transferable, sub-licensable, royalty-free, worldwide
license to use any IP content that you post on or in connection with
Facebook.” 88 The agreement later goes on to state that the user
grants Facebook:

88

Facebook Rights & Responsibilities, supra note 45, § 2.1 It is worth
noting that the terms qualify this license  as  being  subject  to  the   user’s  privacy  
settings, which can be changed to restrict access to posts or pictures only to the
user’s  “friends”  or  even  further  limited  to  specific  contacts  on  the  website;;   see
also id. §§ 18.3, 4, 6, 7 (defining (section   3)   “information”   as   facts   and   other  
information about the user, including actions taken by users and non-users who
interact  with  Facebook;;  (section  4)  “content”  as  anything  you  or  other  users  post  
on Facebook that would not be included in the definition of information;
(section   6)   “post”   as   post   on   Facebook   or   otherwise   make   available   by   using  
Facebook;;  and  (section  7)  “use”  as  use,  run,  copy,  publicly  perform  or  display,  
distribute, modify, translate, and create derivative works of).
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permission to use your name, profile picture,
content, and information in connection with
commercial, sponsored, or related content (such as a
brand you like) served or enhanced by us . . . . you
permit a business or other entity to pay us to display
your name and/or profile picture with your content
or information, without any compensation to you.89
There are a number of ambiguities contained in the preceding
quoted sections that should be discussed and resolved before
continuing.
First is the scope of the license that users grant Facebook. The
clause   “on   or   in   connection   with   Facebook”   could   mean   two  
things: either it refers to how Facebook can use posted intellectual
property, or it states where UGC must be posted in order for
Facebook to receive the license. The definitions listed in the
agreement   do   provide   guidance   here,   as   “post”   specifically   refers  
to posting on Facebook, thus, this license grants Facebook a right
to  use  UGC  “on  or  in connection  with”  Facebook.  You  might  find  
yourself   asking,   what   does   it   mean   for   something   to   be   “in  
connection  with  Facebook?”  Unfortunately  for  users,  the  answer  is  
vague at best.
The  phrase  “in  connection  with”  is  seen  with  relative  frequency  
in legal writing  and  seems  to  be  synonymous  with  “in  relation  to”  
or   “in   association   with.” 90 Thus, users grant Facebook a broad
89

Id. §10.1–2. Paragraph   2   of   this   section   states   “we   do   not   give   your  
content  or  information  to  advertisers  without  your  consent”;;  a  small  consolation  
considering   the   user’s   consent   is   required   for   them   to   post   content   or  
information. Id.
90
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 165 (9th ed. 2009) (defining
“conveyancing”  as  “the  art  or  science  of  preparing  documents  and  investigating  
title in connection with the creation and assurance of interests in land. Despite
its  connection  with  the  word  ‘conveyance’,  the  term  in  practice  is  not  limited to
use in connection with old system title but is used without discrimination in the
context  of  all  types  of  title.”)  (quoting  Peter  Butt,  Land Law at 7 (2d ed. 1988));
id. at  57  (describing  “attribution  right”  as  “[a]  person's  right  to  be  credited  as a
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license to utilize UGC posted on the website for any use in relation
to Facebook—including the sale of user information or
copyrighted work for profit—with no compensation to the posting
user. Any limitations on this IP license are difficult to find.
Facebook can simply sublicense UGC to the highest bidder, or it
could feature user content in advertising, all without compensation
to the user. Users should be wary of the broad license they grant
when registering for the website, but unfortunately, such content
licenses seem to be the industry standard.
2. Twitter
Much  like  the  Facebook  Terms  of  Service,  Twitter’s  terms  first  
explain that the user retains his or her rights to any content posted
on the website.91 The  user  goes  on  to  grant  Twitter  a  “worldwide,  
non-exclusive, royalty-free license (with the right to sublicense) to
use, copy, reproduce, process, adapt, modify, publish, transmit,
display and distribute [posted] Content in any and all media or
distribution  methods.”92 This agreement expressly includes:
[T]he right for Twitter to provide, promote, and
improve the Services and to make Content
submitted to or through the Services available to
other companies, organizations or individuals who
partner with Twitter for the syndication, broadcast,
distribution or publication of such Content on other
media and services, subject to our terms and
conditions for such Content use.93

work's author, to have one's name appear in connection with a work, or to forbid
the  use  of  one's  name  in  connection  with  a  work  that  the  person  did  not  create”).
91
Twitter Terms of Service, supra note 45, § 5 (“You   retain   your   rights   to  
any  Content  you  submit,  post  or  display  on  or  through  [Twitter’s]  Services.”).  
92
Id.
93
See id.   (defining   “Services”   as   Twitter’s   various   websites,   SMS,  
Application Programming Interfaces (APIs), email notifications, applications,
buttons, widgets, ads, and commerce services). The terms further go on to define
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The terms and conditions mentioned above do provide some
safeguards for users––namely, requiring user permission before:
(1) using user content on a commercial durable good or product,
(2) creating an advertisement that implies sponsorship or
endorsement on the   user’s behalf, and (3) using content in a
manner   inconsistent   with   Twitter’s   display   requirements.94 While
the gesture of requiring user permission is admirable, there is no
mention of user compensation. There is, however, a clause in the
developer terms that states: “In  cases  where  Twitter  Content  is  the  
primary basis of the advertising sale, we require you to compensate
[Twitter].”95
The Twitter Terms of Service essentially grant the website a
license to exercise every applicable exclusive right granted to a
copyright owner.96 Through this agreement, users allow Twitter to
sell or license for profit users’ copyrightable material and use any
UGC posted material to advertise Twitter's services.97 While these
terms are more defined than those found in the Facebook Terms of
Service agreement, the breadth of authorized uses for UGC posted
on Twitter is quite astounding. This author, at least, is hard pressed
“Content”   as   “any   information,   text,   graphics,   photos   or   other   materials  
uploaded,  downloaded  or  appearing  on  the  Services.”  Id.
94
Rules
of
the
Road,
TWITTER
DEVELOPERS,
https://dev.twitter.com/overview/terms/rules-of-the-road (last updated Sept. 16,
2014)   (“We   encourage   you   to   create   advertising   opportunities   around   Twitter  
content  that  are   compliant   with  these  Rules.”);;   see also Display Requirements,
TWITTER
DEVELOPERS,
https://dev.twitter.com/overview/terms/displayrequirements (last visited Oct. 16, 2014) (outlining requirements for displaying
Tweets—namely, requiring attribution to the author of the tweet, a visible
timestamp,  the  Twitter  logo,  and  that  the  tweet  “must  not be altered or modified
in  any  way.”).
95
Rules of the Road, supra note 92.
96
Compare 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (granting copyright owners the right to:
(1) reproduce, (2) prepare derivative works, (3) distribute, and (4) display,
publicly, the copyrighted work), with Twitter Terms of Service, supra note 45,
§ 5   (the   user   grants   Twitter   a   license   to   “use,   copy,   reproduce, process, adapt,
modify,  publish,  transmit,  display  and  distribute”  posted  content).  
97
Twitter Terms of Service, supra note 45, § 5.
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to   find   uses   that   could   not   qualify   as   the   “syndication,   broadcast,  
distribution  or  publication”  of  UGC.98
3. LinkedIn
Perhaps the most all-encompassing of the discussed Terms of
Service agreements was that of LinkedIn, an online professional
network with over 300 million users.99 The social networking site
recently modified its terms100 to become much more user-friendly.
But until October 23, 2014, users provided LinkedIn the following
license for their content:
[A] nonexclusive, irrevocable, worldwide, perpetual,
unlimited, assignable, sublicenseable, fully paid up
and royalty-free right to us to copy, prepare derivative
works of, improve, distribute, publish, remove, retain,
add, process, analyze, use and commercialize, in any
way now known or in the future discovered, any
information you provide, directly or indirectly to
LinkedIn, including, but not limited to, any user
generated content, ideas, concepts, techniques, and/or
data to the services, you submit to LinkedIn, without
any further consent, notice and/or compensation to
you or to any third parties.101

98

Id.
About Us, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/about-us (last visited
Oct. 16, 2014) (boasting users in over 200   countries,   LinkedIn’s   mission   is   to  
“connect   the   world’s   professionals   to   make   them   more   productive   and  
successful.”).  
100
User   Agreement,   LINKEDIN,   https://www.linkedin.com/legal/user-agreement  
(last  visited  Jan.  31,  2015).
101
LinkedIn User Agreement, supra note 43, § 2.2. The agreement does
allow users to request the deletion of content/information they post on the
website, unless it has been shared with others who have not deleted the content
or if it has been copied/stored by other users. See id.
99
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There are a number of features within this license that make it
significantly less desirable for the user than those granted to other
users of social media websites.102
First, the license a user grants to LinkedIn is irrevocable.
Defined   as   “unalterable,” 103 this quality means that LinkedIn
retains a license to UGC even after users terminate the agreement.
Content can only be deleted upon request and even this is
contingent on whether other users have also deleted the content.104
Next, the agreement allows LinkedIn to commercialize user
content  “in  any  way  now  known  or  in  the  future  discovered.”105 In
theory, this would seem to allow the website to publish and sell
lists of professionals (users) in a particular field or location, or
compile and sell a book of business advice written entirely by
users, without compensating the creators of the content. Lastly, the
license  allows  LinkedIn  to  use  any  information  provided  “directly  
or   indirectly”   by   the   user. 106 “Indirectly” is colloquially
interchangeable  with  “incidentally,”  meaning  that  this  clause  could  
be interpreted as granting LinkedIn a license to use information
about a user that was provided by a third party.107 The scope of this
license greatly exceeds what would seem to be the norm for Terms
of Service agreements found on social media websites, and

102
It should be noted that LinkedIn is issuing a wide variety of changes to
its Terms of Service agreement. Among these changes is a simplification of the
contractual  language  with  more  limitation  on  LinkedIn’s  licensed  uses  (and  the  
addition of a user ability to revoke the license in any of their content simply by
deleting  the  content  from  LinkedIn),  and  additional  “layman’s”  explanations  of  
contractual language. These proposed changes are available at
https://www.linkedin.com/legal/preview/user-agreement.
103
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining irrevocable as
“[u]nalterable;;  committed  beyond  recall”).  
104
LinkedIn User Agreement, supra note 43.
105
Id. § 2.2.
106
Id.
107
This is, admittedly, more of a privacy issue than a copyright ownership
problem.
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contains what is certainly the broadest content use license that this
author came across in his research.
4. YouTube
Lastly, we look to the Terms of Service agreement found on
YouTube, a widely used social media hub that “allows  billions  of  
people to discover, watch and share originally-created   videos.”108
The section of the agreement containing the intellectual property
license, as would seem to be the industry norm, begins by
expressly explaining  that   “you  retain  all  of   your ownership rights
in   your   Content.”109 In what is likely the broadest allowance for
commercial use, by signing the agreement, a user grants YouTube:
[A]
worldwide,
nonexclusive,
royalty-free,
sublicenseable and transferable license to use,
reproduce, distribute, prepare derivative works of,
display, and perform the Content in connection with
the  Service  and  YouTube’s  (and  its  successors’  and  
affiliates’)  business,  including  without  limitation  for  
promoting and redistributing part or all of the
Service (and derivative works thereof) in any media
formats and through any media channels.110
What is initially obvious in this license, as compared to those
analyzed   above,   is   that   YouTube’s   agreement   would   have   users  
grant the website the exclusive rights associated with copyright

108

About YouTube, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/yt/about/ (last
visited Oct. 16, 2014).
109
YouTube Terms of Service, supra note 45, § 6.C.
110
Id.; see also id. § 2.A   (“‘Content’   includes   the   text,   software,   scripts,  
graphics, photos, sounds, music, videos, audiovisual combinations, interactive
features and other materials you may view on, access through, or contribute to
the Service. The Service includes all aspects of YouTube, including but not
limited to all products, software and services offered via the YouTube website
such  as  the  YouTube  channels,  the  YouTube  ‘Embeddable  Player,’  the  YouTube  
‘Uploader’  and  other  applications.”).  
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almost verbatim.111 Moreover, much like the Facebook Terms of
Service,  we  see  that  YouTube  is  licensed  the  right  to  use  UGC  “in  
connection   with”   its   service   and   business   (and   the   business   of   its  
successors and affiliates). 112 It is consistent with the canons of
statutory interpretation to read this license as giving YouTube the
right to capitalize UGC for at least   “promoting   and  
redistribut[ing]” the YouTube Service. The breadth with which
YouTube can use UGC would hinge on an interpretation of the
language “including   without   limitation.”   There   would   seem   to   be  
two logical interpretations of that passage as it appears in the
Terms of Service agreement: first, it could define uses of UGC in
connection   with   the   service   as   “promoting   and   redistributing,”   or  
second,   the   phrase   could   simply   mean   that   “promoting   and  
redistributing”   are   merely   types   of   usages   that   would   fall   within  
the   “in   connection   with   the   Service”   language—meaning that the
clause is simply illustrative. Case law and  Black’s  Law  Dictionary
suggest  that  the  latter  interpretation  is  correct,  and  that  “promoting  
and   redistributing”   the   service   are   simply   examples   of   how  
YouTube   might   utilize   UGC   “in   connection   with   the   Service.”113
This license, particularly because it can   be   used   by   YouTube’s  
successors and affiliates business, allows the website to hugely
commercialize, or at least profit from, UGC. These agreements
share many similarities with one another, and they are all very
111
Compare 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (granting copyright owners the right
to: (1) reproduce, (2) prepare derivative works, (3) distribute, (4) perform
publicly, (5) and display publicly the copyrighted work), with YouTube Terms of
Service, supra note 45, § 6.C (users license YouTube the right   to   “reproduce,  
distribute,   prepare   derivative   works   of,   display,   and   perform”   user   uploaded  
content).
112
See supra Part II.A.1.a.
113
Optimal Interiors, LLC v. HON Co., 774 F. Supp. 2d 993, 1010 (S.D.
Iowa 2011) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 831 (9th Ed. 2009)
(“[D]efining  the  word  “include”  and  noting  that  “some  drafters  use  phrases  such  
as including without limitation and including but not limited to—which mean
the   same   thing”.   Thus,   the   phrases   ‘including,   without   limitation,’   and  
‘including,   but   not   limited   to’   both   introduce   items   that   comprise   a   part of a
greater  group,  class,  or  aggregate”).
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broad. Especially given the scale of these IP   licenses,   a   user’s  
ability to terminate the agreements (or licenses) is extremely
important to the exercise of their exclusive copyright rights.
B. Termination of the License Granted to Social Media Websites
Most of these agreements do allow the user to terminate them,
at any time and for any reason simply by deactivating their account
and discontinuing use of the service.114 However, and again using
Twitter’s   terms   as   an   example,   the   “Terms   will   terminate . . .
except that the following sections shall continue  to  apply:  4,  5.”115
Sections 4 and 5 in the Twitter Terms of Service govern the
content posted by users and, most notably, includes the license
granted to Twitter to use, copy, modify, and distribute the UGC.
The application of these terms, then, survives   the   user’s  
termination of use—meaning that the user effectively has no way
to limit how often or with whom Twitter shares the user’s content
after posting it, so long as any sharing would fall under the Terms
of Service. After seeing how broad a license users must give social
media websites in order to participate in their online networks, the
question of how long such a license lasts begs to be answered.
1. Facebook
Terminating an account on Facebook is relatively
straightforward. A user can either disable or completely delete an
account at the click (or a few clicks) of a button. 116 However, a
user need not even delete his or her account to remove specific
content.   As   explained   by   the   Terms   of   Service,   “[t]his   IP   license  
ends when you delete your IP content or your account unless your

114

See, e.g., Twitter Terms of Service, supra note 45.
Id.
116
How Do I Permanently Delete My Account?, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/help/224562897555674 (last visited Oct. 2, 2014)
(explaining that deactivating your account makes you invisible on the website,
but your profile information is saved; you can also permanently delete your
account, which leaves no option for information recovery).
115
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content has been shared with others, and they have not deleted
it.” 117 So while users can delete their content (or entire profile)
from Facebook, the ability to actually remove content from
Facebook is contingent on whether other users have done so as
well. 118 While a user does have the power to severely limit the
number   of   other   users   who   can   access   their   “shared”   content,   the  
default   settings   share   a   wide   variety   of   content   with   the   user’s  
“friends.”119 Given that the average number of friends any given
user has on Facebook is 338,120 the amount of difficulty a single
user might face deleting even a single photo from the website

117
Facebook Rights & Responsibilities, supra note 45, §2.1–2.2   (“When  
you delete IP content, it is deleted in a manner similar to the recycle bin on a
computer. However, you understand that removed content may persist in backup
copies  for  a  reasonable  period  of  time  (but  will  not  be  available  to  others).”).  
118
How
To
Post
&
Share,
FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/help/333140160100643/   (Oct.   2,   2014)   (“You   can  
use the audience selector to change who can see stuff you share on your
Timeline after you share it. Keep in mind that when you share something on
someone  else’s  Timeline,  they  control  the  audience  for  the  post.”).  
119
Christo Wilson, Bryce Boe, Alessandra Sala, Krishna P.N. Puttaswamy
& Ben Y. Zhao, User Interactions in Social Networks and their Implications,
EUROSYS
’09
205–06
(2009),
available
at
http://www.cs.ucsb.edu/~ravenben/publications/pdf/interaction-eurosys09.pdf
(“By   default,   a   user’s   profile,   including   birthday,   address,   contact   information,  
Mini-Feed, Wall posts, photos, and photo comments are viewable by anyone in
a shared network. Users can modify privacy settings to restrict access to only
friends, friends-of-friends,   lists   of   friends,   no   one,   or   all.”);;   see also Larry
Magid, Facebook Changes New User Default Privacy Setting to Friends Only—
Adds Privacy Checkup, FORBES (May 22, 2014, 9:00 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/larrymagid/2014/05/22/facebook-changes-defaultprivacy-setting-for-new-users/ (explaining that Facebook just changed new user
default privacy   settings   last   summer   from   “public”   to   share   content   with  
“friends”;;  this  change  “will  have  no  impact  on  existing  users”).  
120
Aaron Smith, 6 New Facts about Facebook, PEW RESEARCH INTERNET
PROJECT (Feb. 3, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/02/03/6new-facts-about-facebook/. Among adults, the average (mean) number of
friends is 338, the median is 200; it is also clear that younger generations tend to
have larger networks, with 27% of users aged 18-29 having more than 500
friends. Id.
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seems staggering. To some extent, the ability of a user to remove
original UGC from Facebook is out of the user’s hands if any other
user   with   whom   the   content   was   “shared”   has   not   deleted   it   as  
well.
All might not be lost, though, as it would seem that Facebook
does   limit   its   ability   to   utilize   UGC   after   the   user’s   account   has  
been terminated. The provision on account termination states:
If you violate the letter or spirit of this Statement, or
otherwise create risk or possible legal exposure for
us, we can stop providing all or part of Facebook to
you. We will notify you by email or at the next time
you attempt to access your account. You may also
delete your account or disable your application at
any time. In all such cases, this Statement shall
terminate, but the following provisions will still
apply: . . . 9.18, 10.3 . . .121
Of particular importance is § 10.1, which is noticeably not
listed as an active provision following account termination.
Provision 10.1 authorizes Facebook to sell user data to businesses
or   “other   entities”   without   compensation   to   the   user—a very
important prospect for users.122 Most of the provisions that remain
active post-termination  concern  the  use  of  Facebook’s  source  code,  
advertising, and the use of other users’ content and are generally
beyond the scope of this article. 123 The fact that Facebook
eliminates its ability to monetize user content is of the utmost
importance for the user to maintain control over his or her
copyrightable content (and is a little bit surprising). Lastly, note the
121

Facebook Rights & Responsibilities, supra note 45, § 15.
Id. § 10.1  (“[Y]ou permit a business or other entity to pay us to display
your name and/or profile picture with your content or information, without any
compensation to you.”).
123
Id. at § 15. The full list of provisions that continue to apply after
termination  are  sections:  “2.2, 2.4, 3-5, 8.2, 9.1-9.3, 9.9, 9.10, 9.13, 9.15, 9.18,
10.3, 11.2, 11.5, 11.6, 11.9, 11.12, 11.13, and 15–19.” Id.
122
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unilateral nature with which Facebook can cease the operations of
a   particular   user’s   account.   By   violating the provisions of the
Terms  of  Service  agreement  or  otherwise  creating  “risk  or  possible  
legal   exposure,”   a   user’s   account   can   be   terminated.   This   precise  
provision,   and   Facebook’s   action   through   it,   has   been   challenged  
and upheld in court.124 Given the unilateral nature that a user can
end the agreement with Facebook, it is not altogether unfair that
Facebook can do the same—it is worth noting that Facebook’s  
business incentivizes the website to increase the number of active
users on the website and the duration of their use.
2. Twitter
Twitter’s  Terms  of  Service,  however,  are  not  so  user-friendly.
Users “may   end   [their]   legal   agreement   with   Twitter   at   any   time  
and for any reason by deactivating [their] accounts and
discontinuing [their] use of the Services.” 125 Following
deactivation, about half of the Terms of Service agreement
continues to apply, including the section containing the UGC
license. 126 This would seem to indicate that, even following
account deactivation, Twitter maintains the right to use UGC  “with  

124

See Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1118 (N.D. Cal.
2011) (plaintiff’s claim failed because she did not allege that Facebook
terminated her account despite her compliance with the terms; thus Facebook
did not violate the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
125
Twitter Terms of Service, supra note 45, § 10   (“You   do   not   need   to  
specifically inform Twitter when you stop using the Services. If you stop using
the Services without deactivating your accounts, your accounts may be
deactivated due to prolonged inactivity under our Inactive   Account   Policy.”);;  
see
also
Inactive
Account
Policy,
TWITTER,
https://support.twitter.com/articles/15362-inactive-account-policy (last visited
Oct.   3,   2014),   (“[B]e   sure   to   log   in   and   Tweet   (i.e.,   post   an   update)   within   6  
months of your last update. Accounts may be permanently removed due to
prolonged  inactivity.”).  
126
Twitter Terms of Service, supra note 45, § 10   (“[Following   account  
deactivation], the Terms shall terminate, including, without limitation, your
license to use the Services, except that the following sections shall continue to
apply:  4,  5,  7,  8,  10,  11,  and  12.”  The  user  IP  license  is  contained  in  section  5.).  
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no  compensation  paid  to  [the  user].”127 At this point you might ask,
can a user do anything to revoke the license granted to Twitter for
the use of the content?
When a user deactivates a user account, Twitter only retains
the “user   data   for   30   days   from the date of deactivation, after
which   it   is   permanently   deleted.” 128 Having said that,   Twitter’s  
Terms of Service do not define what constitutes user data and
whether or not user data includes UGC.129 The agreement defines
content   as   “any   information,   text, graphics, photos or other
materials   uploaded,   downloaded   or   appearing   on   the   services.”130
Data, on the other hand, has a very broad definition. 131 The
qualifier   “user”   seems   to   indicate   that   the   data   can   somehow  
identify a particular user. If this is the case,  then  “user  data”  might  
be  synonymous  with  “personally  identifiable  information”—which
refers   to   a   person’s   name,   address,   telephone   number,   social  
security number, or credit card information.132 However, because a
user is not required to provide any such information to Twitter
when registering an account (indeed, a user can operate an account
through   a   pseudonym),   defining   “user   data”   as   “personally  
identifiable   information”   seems   somewhat   inapt.   But,   particularly  
127
128

Id. § 5.

Deactivating
Your
Account,
TWITTER,
https://support.twitter.com/articles/15358-how-to-deactivate-your-account (last
visited Oct. 20, 2014) (containing additionally the simple steps a user must
follow to deactivate their Twitter account: (1) sign in, (2) go to account settings
and   click   the   “deactivate   account”   button,   (3)   read   account   deactivation  
information   and   click   “Okay,   fine,   deactivate   account,”   and   (4)   enter   their  
password for verification).
129
Applying canons of statutory interpretation that would require
consistency and meaning in each term is inappropriate here, because the
statement regarding the deletion of user data is not contained within the contract.
130
Twitter Terms of Service, supra note 45.
131
Data Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/data (last visited Oct. 20, 2014) (defining data as
“information  that  is  produced  or stored  by  a  computer”).  
132
E.g., 11 U.S.C. § 101(41A) (2012) (providing an equivalent definition
for  “personally  identifiable  information”  as  it  applies  to  the  bankruptcy  code).
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given  that  “user  data”  is  referred  to  when an account is deactivated
(as opposed to terminated), the term may be used to refer to
account-specific information provided by the user.133 If this were
the  case,  a  more  suitable  synonym  for  “user  data”  might  be  “user  
identifiable   information”   (or   “avatar   identifiable   information”).
This   class   of   data   would   include   a   user’s   profile   name,   profile  
picture, biographical information, and location as the user chooses
to display them on Twitter.134 If  this  is  the  case,  then  perhaps  “user  
data”   refers   to   some   of   the user-uploaded content but does not
encompass the term.135
Assuming that such a conclusion is proper, then Twitter
maintains  a  license  to  use  some  user  uploaded  “Content”  even  after  
account termination. The Terms of Service agreement at no point
references the ability of a user to remove content from the website,
but  Twitter  does  “reserve  the  right  at  all  times  to  remove  or  refuse  
to   distribute   any   Content   on   the   Services.”136 The stark reality is
that users grant Twitter an irrevocable license to use much of the
content that they upload on the website, and these same users
appear to lack any control over their UGC once it has been posted.

133

Indeed, termination as contemplated by the agreement most likely takes
place at the point that the user data is permanently deleted.
134
See generally Lance Ulanoff, Twitter’s   New   Profiles:   Everything   You  
Need
to
Know,
MASHABLE
(Apr.
8,
2014),
http://mashable.com/2014/04/08/twitters-new-profiles-what-you-need-to-know/
(explaining some changes Twitter made to their profile layouts, as well as how
to organize and set up profile information).
135
See Twitter Terms of Service, supra note 45 (defining   “Content”   to  
include   “any  information  .  .  .  uploaded,  downloaded  or  appearing  on”  Twitter;;  
thus,  the  definition  would  seem  to  include  a  user’s  profile  information).  
136
Id. § 8   (“We   reserve   the   right   at   all   times   (but   will   not   have   an  
obligation) to remove or refuse to distribute any Content on the Services, to
suspend or terminate users, and to reclaim usernames without liability to [the
user].”);;  see also id. § 9  (“We  reserve  the  right  to  remove  Content  alleged  to  be  
infringing without prior notice, at our sole discretion, and without liability to
[the  user].”).  
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3. LinkedIn
Much of the LinkedIn user agreement also survives account
termination. The agreement provides:
You may terminate this Agreement, for any or no
reason, at any time, with notice to LinkedIn
pursuant to section 9.3. This notice will be effective
upon LinkedIn processing your notice. LinkedIn
may terminate this agreement and your account for
any reason or no reason, at any time, with or
without notice . . . . Upon termination of your
LinkedIn account, you lose access to the Services.
The terms of this Agreement shall survive any
termination,   except   Section   3   (‘Your   Rights’)   and  
Sections   4.1.,   4.2.,   and   4.3.   (‘Our   Rights and
Obligations’). 137
The notice requirement as written into the agreement by
LinkedIn is fair, albeit slightly unusual and seemingly cumbersome
for the user. Regardless, the user content license, as contained in
section 2.2 of the agreement, survives account termination. And
much   like   the   Twitter   Terms   of   Service   agreement,   LinkedIn’s  
agreement does not contain any provision detailing the ability of
users to remove their content from the website. It is worth noting,
however, that LinkedIn is in the process of changing this aspect of
its agreement.138 Prior to these changes taking effect, the LinkedIn
Terms of Service make no mention of the ability of the user to

137

LinkedIn User Agreement, supra note 43, §§ 7.1, 7.3; See also id. § 9.3
(providing a link to a question submission form and a mailing address for
providing notice to LinkedIn).
138
Email from LinkedIn Messages, LinkedIn Customer Service, to author
(Oct. 3, 2014, 9:37 CST) (on file with author) (Effective as of October 23, 2014,
the user will have the ability to remove their content from the control of
LinkedIn.   “If   you   delete   something   from   our   platform,   we   won’t   use   it  
anymore.”).  
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remove content from the website. So, the pending changes to
LinkedIn’s  content  termination  policy are extremely user-friendly.
Additionally, the clause granting LinkedIn the ability to
commercialize user content survives account termination. 139 The
maintenance of such a right, coupled with the inability of the user
to remove posted content from the website, essentially allows
LinkedIn to appropriate user content for its own monetary benefit,
even long after the user has deleted his or her account from the
website. The language granting LinkedIn the right to
commercialize user content is completely missing from the
pending update to the Terms of Service agreement.140
The conclusions to draw here are mixed. On one hand,
LinkedIn’s   Terms   of   Service   agreement   as   it   currently   stands  
exploits user content to a much higher degree than those of similar
services; on the other hand, the proposed changes to the agreement
are significantly more favorable to the user. Here is to hoping that
LinkedIn can set the gold standard for years to come, as a
harbinger of user-friendly terms of service agreements on social
media.
4. YouTube
YouTube’s  license  to user video content posted online, in sharp
contrast to the other agreements discussed, is contingent on when
the user removes the content from YouTube’s website. The Terms
of Service agreement provides “licenses granted by [the user] in
video Content [submitted] to the Service [to] terminate within a
139

LinkedIn User Agreement, supra note 43, § 2.2 (“[Y]ou  grant  LinkedIn  a  
. . . right to . . . use and commercialize, in any way now known or in the future
discovered, any information you provide, directly or indirectly to LinkedIn,
including, but not limited to, any user generated content, ideas, concepts,
techniques and/or data to the services, you submit to LinkedIn, without any
further consent, notice and/or compensation to you or to any third parties.”).
140
See
Preview
User
Agreement,
LINKEDIN,
https://www.linkedin.com/legal/preview/user-agreement (last visited Oct. 20,
2014) (previewing User Agreement to take effect Oct. 23, 2014).
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commercially reasonable time after [the user] remove[s] or
delete[s] [the] videos from the Service.”141 The users “understand
and agree, however, that YouTube may retain, but not display,
distribute, or perform, server copies of [the] videos that have been
removed or deleted.”142 Finally,  the  licenses“ granted by [the user]
in user comments [they] submit are perpetual and irrevocable.”143
More so than the other analyzed agreements, YouTube’s  Terms  
of Service allow a user to maintain control over the dissemination
of the content they upload to the website. But, what is a
“commercially   reasonable   time?”   Both   case   law   and   statutory  
provisions direct that this is to be a highly fact-intensive
determination.144 Certainly, it would be unreasonable for YouTube
to   continue   to   distribute  a   user’s   video   (through   the   power   of   the  
license) six months after the user removed the video from
YouTube. How about one month? One week? One day? Given the
speed of transactions available via the Internet, a commercially
reasonable time likely does not extend beyond one month.
Ultimately, however, this determination would only be made if
necessitated by litigation—it suffices to say that the language is not
facially burdensome for users.
A larger cause for concern arises from the perpetual and
irrevocable license in user comments. Certainly, comments are less
likely to contain very strong copyright protection interests, but
users could claim protection in them, assuming the material is
copyrightable. 145 And   quite   honestly,   YouTube’s   reason for
maintaining a right to the comments is likely more for the purpose
141

YouTube Terms of Service, supra note 45.
Id.
143
Id. § 6(C).
144
See First Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Jefferson Mortg. Co., 576 F.2d 479,
492   (3d   Cir.   1978)   (“Ordinarily,   the   circumstances   of   the   particular   market  
involved  should  determine  the  duration  of  a  ‘commercially  reasonable  time.’”);;  
U.C.C. §1-205(a)  (2013)  (“Whether a time for taking an action . . . is reasonable
depends  on  the  nature,  purpose,  and  circumstances  of  the  action.”).  
145
See supra Part I.B.1.
142
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of maintaining and facilitating popular discussion topics than
monetizing user content. However, the ability to commercialize
comments continues to exist, and with it the ability of YouTube to
exploit UGC.
IV. THE APPLICATION OF THE UNCONSCIONABILITY
DOCTRINE TO SOCIAL MEDIA TERMS OF SERVICE
AGREEMENTS
Users, because they have agreed to the terms of service, may
look to raise unconscionability as a remedy applicable to contracts
generally. 146 Unconscionability requires a showing of two
components: (1) procedural––looking for unequal bargaining
power and hidden terms; and (2) substantive––“satisfied  by  overly  
harsh or one-sided   results   that   ‘shock   the   conscience.’” 147 A
determination of unconscionability “cannot be determined merely
by examining the face of the contract,” but requires inquiry into
“the   circumstances   under   which   the   contract   was   executed,   its  
purpose, and effect.”148 Given that users certainly do not hold an
equal bargaining position as compared to social media websites
and the expansive licensing achieved through the Terms of Service
agreements  could  “shock  the  conscience,”  users  who  post  UGC  on  
social media sites may have a strong case on their hands.
A. Procedural Unconscionability
“A contract, or a clause within that contract, is procedurally
unconscionable if it is a contract of adhesion.” 149 The term
146

See Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1172 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
Id. The two elements interact such that  “the  more  significant  one  is,  the  
less  significant  the  other  need  be.”  Id.
148
Id.
149
Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 605 (E.D. Penn.
2007); see also Nelson v. McGoldrick, 896 P.2d 1258, 1262 (Wash. 1995) (en
banc)   (“Procedural   unconscionability has been described as the lack of a
meaningful choice, considering all the circumstances surrounding the
transaction  including  ‘[t]he  manner  in  which  the  contract  was  entered,’  whether  
each   party   had   ‘a   reasonable   opportunity   to   understand   the terms of the
147
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unconscionable contemplates   a   contract   “imposed   and   drafted   by  
the party of superior bargaining strength, [which] relegates the
subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or
reject   it.” 150 Terms of Service agreements are contracts of
adhesion––they are presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. 151
While there are few market alternatives152––as many social media
websites have similar terms––the unconscionability inquiry also
looks to surprise or  the   extent  to   which  the  “terms   of  the  bargain  
are   hidden.” 153 This analysis warrants a case-by-case inquiry, as
each websites terms of service are presented differently. However,
on the whole, these terms are contracts of adhesion, and some do
contain hidden clauses that dictate rights and licenses of user
content.
1. Oppression
“Oppression  arises  from  an  inequality  of  bargaining  power  that  
results in no real negotiation and an absence of meaningful
choice.” 154 Users, when subscribing to various social media
websites, are given no opportunity to negotiate the terms of the
contract and are simply required to assent to the terms of the

contract,’   and   whether   ‘the   important   terms   [were]   hidden   in   a   maze   of   fine  
print.’”   (quoting   Schroeder   v.   Fageol   Motors,   Inc.,   544   P.2d   20,   23   (Wash.  
1975) (en banc))).
150
Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 689
(Cal. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
151
See Bragg,  487  F.  Supp.  2d  at  606  (explaining  that  Second  Life’s  terms  
were a contract of adhesion because a potential participant could either assent to
the agreement and enter, or refuse and be denied access).
152
See Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1172 (9th Cir.
2003)  (“[T]he  availability  of  other  options  does  not  bear  on  whether  a  contract  is  
procedurally  unconscionable.”).  
153
Bragg, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 606 (internal quotation marks omitted).
154
Newton v. Am. Debt Servs., Inc., 854 F. Supp. 2d 712, 722–23 (N.D.
Cal.   2012)   (“While California courts have found that consumer choice can
reduce how procedurally unconscionable an arbitration clause is, consumer
choice is not determinative of whether there is any procedural
unconscionability.”).  
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agreement in order to utilize the offered services. Plain and simple,
the Terms of Service agreements used by social media websites are
“standardized   contract[s],   imposed   upon   the   subscribing   party
without an opportunity to negotiate the  terms”155––in other words,
they are contracts of adhesion. “An   adhesion   contract   fulfills   the  
requirement of procedural unconscionability, although this alone is
insufficient to render an arbitration clause unenforceable.”156
2. Surprise
Surprise looks to whether the particular clause was hidden
within the terms of a contract. 157 Considerations affecting this
analysis are length of the contract, typeface used, and location of
the particular clause within the contract. 158 The intellectual
property license found in Terms of Service agreements posted on
social media sites could be found to constitute surprise, but the
argument is certainly not one-sided. The agreements examined in
this paper are well labeled, relatively short, and often include a
layman’s   explanation   of   contractual   language   – showing a clear
effort to increase access to legally uneducated users.
Facebook’s   content   license   is   not   necessarily   a   “surprise”  
clause under legal analysis, but such a finding would not be
unreasonable. The clause can be found on page one of a seven
page agreement and may be considered “set  apart  from  the  rest  of  

155

Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 983 (9th
Cir. 2007) (quoting Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1281 (9th Cir.
2006)).
156
Newton, 854 F. Supp.   2d   at   723   (“[U]se of a contract of adhesion
establishes a minimal degree of procedural unconscionability notwithstanding
the availability of market alternatives.”)   (citing   Sanchez v. Valencia Holding
Co., 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 19, 31 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 2011).
157
Id. at 722–23   (“‘Surprise   involves   the   extent   to   which   the   supposedly  
agreed-upon terms are hidden in a prolix printed form drafted by the party
seeking  to  enforce  [the  disputed  terms].’”).  
158
See, e.g., Estate of Myhra v. Royal Carribean Cruises, 695 F.3d 1233,
1246 (11th Cir. 2012).
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the agreement,”159 in that it is one of five clauses under the specific
heading   “Sharing   Your   Content   and   Information”   (which   is   the  
second main heading in the agreement). 160 However, the user
agrees   to   the   terms   by   simply   clicking   a   “Sign   Up”   button   when  
registering his or her account—at no point is a user forced to
actually examine the agreement. 161 This specific issue was
thoroughly discussed in Fteja v. Facebook, Inc.162 In that case, the
court   explained   that   Facebook’s   Terms   of   Service   agreement   was  
not  a  classic  “clickwrap”  agreement163 because  it  does  not  “contain  
any mechanism that that forces the user to actually examine the
terms   before   assenting.” 164 The court instead determined that
Facebook’s   Terms   of   Service   agreement   was   a   hybrid  

159

See Zaborowski  v.  MHN  Gov’t  Servs.,  Inc.,  936 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1152
(N.D. Cal. 2013) (“The   arbitration   clause   appears   in   paragraph   twenty   of  
twenty-three paragraphs. It is not set apart from the rest of the agreement in any
way, such as highlighting or outlining; the signature line is on the following
page,  and  it  does  not  require  a  separate  signature.”).
160
Facebook Statement of Rights & Responsibilities, supra note 45, § 2.
161
FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2014).
When a new user visits the website, he or she is prompted to enter a name,
email/phone number, password, birthday, and gender. To complete the
registration   process,   a   user   must   click   the   “Sign   Up”   button, above which is
written:  “[b]y  clicking  Sign  Up,  you  agree  to  our  Terms  and  that  you  have  read  
our   Data   Use   Policy,   including   our   Cookie   Use.”   The   words   “Terms,”   “Data  
Use  Policy,”  and  “Cookie  Use”  are  all  hyperlinked,  but,  quite  literally,  are  found  
on different pages. Id.
162
841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 837–38 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
163
Id. at  837  (“Yet  Facebook’s  Terms  of  Use  are  not  a  pure-form clickwrap
agreement . . . .”).   “On   the   internet,   [sic]   the   primary   means   of   forming   a  
contract are the so-called  ‘clickwrap’  (or  ‘click-through’)  agreements,  in  which  
website  users  typically  click  an  ‘I  agree’  box  after  being  presented  with  a  list  of  
terms and conditions of use . . . .”   Hines   v.   Overstock.com,   Inc.,   668 F.
Supp. 2d 362, 366 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
164
Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 838; see also Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc.,
356 F.3d 393, 429 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[U]nder  a  clickwrap  arrangement,   potential  
licensees are presented with the proposed license terms and forced to expressly
and unambiguously manifest either assent or rejection prior to being given
access  to  the  product.”).
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clickwrap/“browsewrap”   agreement. 165 In reasoning that terms
provided via hyperlink were akin to multiple pages of a contract,
the court concluded that the user assented to the terms of the
agreement in registering a Facebook account—instrumental to this
finding was the familiarity the user had with using the Internet.166
This ruling clearly puts the burden on the user to show that the IP
license was a surprise, but much like Atlas, the weight of the world
often rests on the shoulders of a single, average Internet user.
The crux of this argument would lie in differentiating a forum
selection clause from an intellectual property license. As a
preliminary   matter,   “[t]he   general   rule   is   that   forum   selection  
clauses  are  regularly  enforced.”167 While such has never been said
in regards to copyright licenses, grants of nonexclusive licenses do
not require a writing (the exclusive transfer of copyrights do).168

165

Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 838 (“Facebook's  Terms  of  Use  are  somewhat  
like a browsewrap agreement in that the terms are only visible via a hyperlink,
but also somewhat like a clickwrap agreement in that the user must do
something else—click   “Sign   Up”—to assent to the hyperlinked terms. Yet,
unlike some clickwrap agreements, the user can click to assent whether or not
the  user  has  been  presented  with  the  terms.”);;  see also Hines, 668 F. Supp. 2d at
366   (defining   a   “browsewrap”   agreement   as   one   “where   website   terms   and  
conditions of use are posted on the website typically as a hyperlink at the bottom
of  the  screen”).  
166
Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 839–41 (“[A]t   least   for   those   to   whom   the  
internet is in [sic] an indispensable part of daily life, clicking the hyperlinked
phrase is the twenty-first century equivalent of turning over the cruise ticket. In
both cases, the consumer is prompted to examine terms of sale that are located
somewhere else. Whether  or  not  the  consumer  bothers  to  look  is  irrelevant.”).  
167
Elite Parfums, Ltd. v. Rivera, 872 F. Supp. 1269, 1271 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(citing Carnival Cruise Lines, 1 S.Ct. 1522 (1991); see, e.g., Stewart Org., Inc.
v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988); The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,
407 U.S. 1, 92 (1972); Weiss v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 801 F.
Supp. 2d 1276, 1282 (S.D.N.Y.1992)).
168
Foad Consulting Group, Inc. v. Azzalino, 270 F.3d 821, 825 (9th Cir.
2001)   (“[G]rants of nonexclusive copyright licenses need   not   be   in   writing.”);;  
see 17 U.S.C. § 204(a)   (2012)   (“A   transfer   of   copyright   ownership,   other   than  
by operation of law, is not valid unless an instrument of conveyance, or a note or
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Given  that  a  “nonexclusive  copyright  license  may  be  granted  orally  
or   by   implication,” 169 it would seem difficult to require separate
assent for the license when a user agrees to the Terms of Service
agreement. However, implied   copyright   licenses   “simply   permit  
the   use   of   a   copyrighted   work   in   a   particular   manner”170 and are
extremely uncommon.171 Obviously the license at issue is a written
one, but trouble may arise because users are not forced to read—or
even look at—the agreement before assenting to a license (an
entire agreement, really) that is found on a separate page. 172 This
factor was important when analyzing the surprise of an arbitration
clause. 173 A copyright license, particularly one as broad as the
implied one, should be given due consideration—I do not see why
social media websites should be spared for making clear what its
users are agreeing to.
The IP license in Twitter’s   Terms   of   Service   is contained in
section 5 of the contract, which is titled “Your  Rights”  and  found  
on page two of a seven-page agreement.174 Immediately below the
license,   Twitter   writes   a   “tip”   that   states:   “This   license   is   you  
authorizing us to make your Tweets available to the rest of the
memorandum of the transfer, is in writing and signed by the owner of the rights
conveyed . . . .”).
169
Foad, 270 F.3d at 826.
170
I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 768, 775 (7th Cir. 1996).
171
Estate of Hevia v. Portrio Corp., 602 F.3d 34,  41  (1st  Cir.  2010)  (“We do
not mean to suggest that implied licenses are an everyday occurrence
in copyright matters. The opposite is true: implied licenses are found only in
narrow  circumstances.”).
172
See Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 837–38  (“While  the  Terms  of  Use  require  
the  user  to  click  on  ‘Sign  Up’  to  assent,  they  do  not  contain any mechanism that
forces  the  user  to  actually  examine  the  terms  before  assenting.”).
173
See Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 605 (E.D.
Penn. 2007); see also Lau v. Mercedes-Benz, No. CV 11-1940,
2012 WL 370557, at *8 (N.D. Cal. 2012)  (“Although the paragraph on the front
mentions the arbitration clause on the back, the language lies imbedded
inconspicuously within a paragraph of the same font size, and on the opposite
side of the page where the Mr. Lau's signature was required.”).
174
Twitter Terms of Service, supra note 45, § 5.
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world  and  to  let  others  do  the  same.”175 The desire to inform users
as to what the agreement states is admirable, and a showing that a
user understood the contract can weigh against a finding of
procedural unconscionability.176 However,   Twitter’s   “tip”   doesn’t  
adequately describe the license. While Twitter is likely explaining
a majority of its uses under the license, the actual conveyance of
rights is far greater than what a reader might assume. Further, there
is no explanation of the terms explaining that users will receive no
compensation for the use of their work. While the comparison
might leave something to be wanting, I would argue that an IP
clause should require the same kind of treatment within a contract
as a class-action waiver. In such scenarios, courts have required
that the particular clause be in all-caps font and presented in a
“conspicuous   manner.” 177 The IP license could be labeled with
more clarity, explained more honestly, and all-caps font could be
used to focus readers in on more important parts of the license.
While none of this is done, as explained above, it is quite clear that
a nonexclusive copyright grant is not as central of a right to a user
as the ability to participate in a class-action lawsuit. Ultimately, the
element of surprise is most likely not fulfilled, as the IP license is
easy to find and easy to read (the same can be said of the other
analyzed Terms of Service agreements).
175

Id. (The   tip   is   referring   to   the   IP   license:   “By submitting, posting or
displaying Content on or through the Services, you grant us a worldwide, nonexclusive, royalty-free license (with the right to sublicense) to use, copy,
reproduce, process, adapt, modify, publish, transmit, display and distribute such
Content in any and all media or distribution methods (now known or later
developed).”).
176
Nelson v. McGoldrick, 896 P.2d 1258, 1262 (Wash. 1995) (en banc)
(weighing against a finding of procedural unconscionability because there was
no indication that McGoldrick lacked adequate time to study the contract, and
there was no indication that she did not understand the contract language).
177
Pleasants v. Am. Express Co., 541 F.3d 853, 857 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing
Pleasants v. Am. Express Co., No. 4:06–CV–1516, 2007 WL 2407010, at *5
(E.D. Mo. Aug.17, 2007)   (“[T]he   class-action waiver was in all-caps font and
found   that   the   ‘conspicuous   manner   in which the arbitration clause was
presented distinguishes this case from those which found the clauses invalid.’”).
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B. Substantive Unconscionability
Substantive unconscionability focuses on the one-sidedness of
the contract terms considering a number of different factors, but
the   most   fundamental   requirement   is   that   it   “shock   the  
conscience.”178 Many cases on substantive unconscionability dealt
with arbitration clauses instead of copyright license agreements,
making their analyses somewhat inapplicable to these
circumstances. Yet, an important factor that has previously been
considered is that of mutuality, or whether the contractual terms
contain  a  “modicum  of  bilaterality.”179 This analysis considers the
facial  neutrality  of  the  contract  as  well  as  “the  actual  effects  of  the  
challenged  provision.”180 In this particular field, other elements are
certainly   of   importance:   the   user’s   right   to   regulate   the  
dissemination of his or her content beyond the authorized company
and profits made using UGC. An application of these standards
and a discussion of other relevant considerations will result in a
finding that the terms of usage are substantively unconscionable.
Class action waivers found in consumer contracts have been
found to be substantively unconscionable.181 A primary distinction

178

Newton v. Am. Debt Servs., 854 F. Supp. 2d 712, 724 (N.D.Cal. 2012);
see also Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1280 (9th Cir. 2006)
(quoting Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 24 Cal.4th 83,
114,   99   Cal.Rptr.2d   745,   6   P.3d   669   (2000)   (“An   arbitration   provision   is  
substantively   unconscionable   if   it   is   ‘overly   harsh’   or   generates   ‘one-sided
results.’”).
179
Id.; see also Abramson v. Juniper Networks, Inc., 115 Cal. App. 4th 638,
657  (Cal.  6th  Dist.  Ct.  App.  2004)  (“[T]he  paramount  consideration  in  assessing  
conscionability  is  mutuality.”).
180
Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1149 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding an
arbitration provision in a contract unconscionable because the terms allowed the
defendant   to   “impose   the   arbitration   forum   on   the   weaker   party   without  
accepting  that  forum  for  itself”).  
181
See Chalk v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 560 F.3d 1087, 1096 (9th Cir. 2009)
(explaining that the class action waiver in T-Mobile’s   service   agreement   was  
substantively unconscionable because it is unilateral in effect, and it discourages
consumers from litigation, effectively robbing them of their right to be
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between a class action waiver and the intellectual property license
at bar is, of course, that a waiver denies a right, while a license
assigns rights to another. Regardless, the one-sided terms
contained within the Terms of Service agreements concern
termination   of   the   IP   license.   Of   particular   issue   are   Facebook’s  
content deletion barrier and the lack of license revocation in
Twitter’s  and  LinkedIn’s  terms of service.182 But for this particular
analysis,   Twitter’s   termination   clause   presents   the   best   case   for  
substantive unconscionability.183
A lack of mutuality is important when considering substantive
unconscionability. 184 The Terms of Service agreement here,
particularly with respect to the IP license, is absolutely onesided.185 But  most  important  is  whether  the  agreement  is  “so  onesided as to shock the conscience.”186 A user, when agreeing to the
Terms   of   Service,   licenses   Twitter   a   “worldwide,   non-exclusive,
royalty-free license (with the right to sublicense) to use, copy,
reproduce, process, adapt, modify, publish, transmit, display and
distribute [posted content] in any and all media or distribution
methods.”187 For this license, the user gains access to the Twitter
compensated for a claim); see also Vasquez-Lopez v. Beneficial Oregon, Inc.,
152  P.3d  940,  950  (Or.  Ct.  App.  2007)  (“[T]he opportunity that the class action
ban denies to borrowers is, in many instances, a crucial one, without which
many  meritorious  claims  would  simply  not  be  filed.”).
182
See supra Part III.B.1–3.
183
When a user terminates his or her Facebook profile, Facebook loses its
ability to monetize user content. Twitter does no such thing. Additionally,
because  LinkedIn’s  Terms  of  Service  will  soon  be  undergoing  a  radical  change,  
it makes little sense to analyze the current agreement for unconscionability.
Email from LinkedIn Messages, LinkedIn Customer Service, to author (Oct. 3,
2014, 9:37 CST) (on file with author).
184
Grabowski v. Robinson, 817 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1173 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (a
“lack  of  mutuality  is relevant  in  analyzing”  substantive  unconscionability).  
185
But perhaps it is necessary. Twitter could not hand away its IP content
and stay in business for very long.
186
Grabowski, 817 F. Supp. 2d at 1173 (quoting Davis v. O'Melveny &
Myers, 485 F.3d 1066, 1075 (9th Cir. 2007)).
187
Agence Fr. Presse v. Morel, 934 F. Supp. 2d 547, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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network and any specific activities associated with such access—
the agreement expressly states that Twitter will not compensate the
user for the use of his or her content.188 And, when a user decides
to remove content from Twitter, the termination provision makes
no guarantee that Twitter will end its use of UGC. 189 In this
situation, the party with more bargaining power and sophistication
has acquired a large bundle of rights through the veil of a
nonexclusive license. This result certainly shocks the conscience
because a user to the website has traded the ability to monetize an
indefinite amount of uploaded material in exchange for access to a
service (that will commercialize the   user’s   content   in   his   stead).  
Given the right facts, where Twitter has substantially profited from
the unsolicited use (outside the Terms of Service agreement) of a
user’s   content,   the   website’s   agreement   could   be   found   both  
procedurally and substantively unconscionable, rendering it legally
unenforceable. However, because  Twitter’s  terms  are  significantly  
more one-sided, and the facts necessary are quite specific, this
result would likely not apply to the agreements employed by
Facebook or YouTube or LinkedIn.
V. SOCIAL MEDIA TERMS OF SERVICE AGREEMENTS AS
AGAINST COPYRIGHT POLICY
In the case that a court would find the social media Terms of
Service agreements conscionable, and thus valid under contract
law, this author would like to argue in the alternative that enforcing
these Terms of Service agreements ultimately undermines the
purpose of copyrights. 190 By disseminating the content of users
beyond any expectation they might have when originally

188

Id.
See supra Part III.B.2.
190
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186,   247   (2003)   (“copyright statutes must
serve  public,  not  private,  ends;;  that  they  must  seek  ‘to  promote  the  Progress’  of  
knowledge and learning; and that they must do so both by creating incentives for
authors to produce . . . .”)   (quoting 2 S. JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1151 (4th rev. ed. 1773)).
189
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registering to use the service, these social media websites are
lowering the incentive of users to create original work and post it
to these online communities. The primary objective of copyright
law   is   to   secure   to   the   public   “the   benefits   derived   from   authors’  
labors”—it is well accepted that part of this benefit is gained when
original works are created.191 Additionally, copyright laws exist to
“facilitate   the   flow   of   ideas   in   the   interest   of   learning.” 192
Protection for works, then, is granted in order to incentivize artistic
creativity through the grant of a temporary monopoly over the
work. 193 It   has   been   said   by   the   Supreme   Court   that   “[t]he sole
interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring
the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public from
the  labors  of  authors.”194
Are the terms of these agreements not effectively robbing lay
users of the exclusive rights associated with their copyrights?
Given that the Terms of Service agreements analyzed here confer a
license that includes every single exclusive right granted to
copyright owners, the user has lost control over the monopoly
granted to them by the Constitution.195 This economic incentive,
the  “sole  interest”  in  providing  copyright  protection  at  all,  rests in
the ability of the owner to control the reproduction and
dissemination of his or her work. The simple fact is that lay

191
H.R. REP. NO. 100-609, at 17 (1988)  (“Under the U.S. Constitution, the
primary objective of copyright law is not to reward the author, but rather to
secure for the public the benefits derived from the authors' labors. By giving
authors an incentive to create, the public benefits in two ways: when the original
expression is created and . . . when the limited term . . . expires and the creation
is  added  to  the  public  domain.”).
192
Id. at 22.
193
Cnty. of Suffolk v. First Am. Real Estate Solutions, 261 F.3d 179, 194
(2d   Cir.   2001)   (“Copyright benefits the public by providing an incentive to
stimulate artistic creativity through the grant of a temporary monopoly to
a copyright owner.”).
194
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932).
195
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012); see supra Part
II.A.1.a–d.
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Internet users do not fully understand the copyrights they hold,
particularly because life in a digital world demolishes the fixation
barrier precluding copyright protection to mere conversations. The
invention of the computer coupled with widespread internet usage
means that copyrightable material is easier than ever to create, and
harder than ever to control. 196 And, while it may certainly be
argued with some legitimacy that Internet users should understand
the risks of posting any content online (regardless of location), the
crux of the issue lies with commercialization of UGC.
By establishing a marketable right   to   monetize   an   author’s  
creative  expression,  “copyright supplies the economic incentive to
create and disseminate   ideas.”197 While a large majority of UGC
posted on social media websites is uploaded and forgotten with
little financial impact, social media websites clearly profit from the
trafficking and distribution of the content—if they did not, why
would their Terms of Service agreements include express
provisions allowing the websites to sell user information and
content?198 Under these circumstances, the incentive to disseminate
still exists, but it has changed hands through the granting of a
license. It is true that social media websites are better situated to
profit off UGC, but is it fair to strip the providers of this content of
any compensation for their original works? Ultimately, the IP

196
Internet Watch Foundation, Study of Self-Generated Sexually Explicit
Images & Videos Featuring Young People Online, p. 6, available at
https://www.iwf.org.uk/assets/media/resources/IWF%20study%20%20self%20generated%20content%20online_Sept%202012.pdf (finding that
88%   of   content   assessed   appeared   on   “parasite”   websites,   demonstrating   the  
startling lack of control capable of being exercised once content has been
circulated online).
197
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558
(1985); see also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic
philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and
copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal
gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and
inventors  in  ‘Science  and  useful  Arts.’”).
198
See supra Part III.A.
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license found in social media Terms of Service agreements
eliminate the individualized incentive to create new works, swindle
users out of any due compensation, and should be found to violate
the copyright clause of the Constitution.
It might be said that many users would be willing to surrender
their control over UGC that they submit; that it is understood as a
price to be paid in order to participate in social media and social
networking generally. And while this may be true—forums and
message boards are certainly social media hubs for beginning and
participating in discussions—users at the very least should be
informed of the property rights they ultimately relinquish. If
nothing else, users should be aware of the copyrights they own and
should be required to explicitly agree to each commercial use of
their UGC—ideally with the ability to negotiate for fair
compensation. This would seem to strike a balance between
creation incentives and corporate monetization interests. By
allowing users to refuse to commercialize their content, they would
retain control over the dissemination of their work beyond the
specific social media website on which it was posted.
Control. In a digital age, the ability to control your content is
paramount, and allowing users retain this right is the best way to
serve copyright interests.
VI. CONCLUSION
Right now, as humanity experiences an Internet revolution, or
better yet, a digital renaissance, it is more important than ever to
adapt our intangible property laws with the times. Widespread
Internet usage presents a vast array of unique and troubling
copyright problems, many of which have yet to be solved or
struggle to function under antiquated laws. Users across the world
participate in social media and submit content, which is subject to
copyright protection, online for free and without the expectation of
compensation. Social media sites hosting the material manage to
commercialize user content and reap substantial benefits from its
utilization. Contract law is unable to solve the problem created
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under these circumstances, but a fix should be rooted in the
underlying policy of copyright law. A compromise will best
temper the competing interests of user rights and social media
(corporate) interests. By granting users the right of first refusal in
regard to monetizing their content, we can keep the control of
copyrightable works where it belongs, in the hands of the creator.
Social media offers a beautiful beacon of human creation—of pure,
raw expression—we need only protect its potential, and the rest, as
they say, is #history.

